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If you can recognize God, and you have learned to relate to him as existing in the
world – if this God is real to you – you should feel the feelings that should come from
such a relationship.
But if God can show up, he can also go away.
T.M. Luhrmann,
When God Talks Back
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In this thesis, I explore the psychological and experiential aspects of the shift from
a supernatural theistic worldview (specifically born-again Christianity) to a
philosophically naturalistic and atheistic worldview in the context of the religious
landscape in the U.S. I posit that certain features of this transition, which is known as
"deconversion,” can be thought of as potentially analogous, both psychologically and
subjectively, to the experience of another's death as an objective environmental change. I
provide anthropological and psychological evidence that believers often experience the
God of born-again Christianity as an independently existing and active agent in the
world. The similarities between human relationships and God relationships provide the
foundation for the claim that loss of these relationships potentially constitute similar
experiences, respectively. Both shifts (deconversion and death) share a number of
similarities. For example, they both feature a reduction in the number of entities that are
believed perceived as having minds (i.e., theory of mind determinations). Also, both
shifts require a re-understanding of purpose and meaning in the world (i.e., teleological
reasoning). I explore each of these shifts in detail. Finally, I show that the interpretation
of the deconversion experience as analogous to the experience of death has implications
for the public dialogue between Christians and atheists.
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Chapter I: What’s It Like?
Having lived most of my life in the Christian fold, I recognize I cannot ask you simply to
jettison your faith as if it were a common pair of dirty trousers. My own transition was
long and painful, rather more like ripping off my very skin than shedding my trousers.
- Kenneth Daniels,
former born-again Christian missionary
What is it like to experience a shift in one’s orientation toward the world? What is
it like to believe fundamentally different ideas today about the nature of reality than you
did in the past? Specifically, what is it like to experience the loss of religious belief? For
an increasing number of people in the United States, such a worldview shift is a reality
(Newport, “No Religious Identity”) and many of those who have denied previous
religious affiliations or lost previously held religious faith have lost the belief in the God
of Christianity specifically.1 This is understandable since Christianity is the religion of a
large majority of the U.S. population (Newport, “Christianity Remains Dominant”) and
given the recent rise in atheism and agnosticism, respectively (WIN-Gallup International;
Kosmin & Keysar). Such a worldview shift is unique to every individual and is often
deeply transformative, affecting how individuals experience themselves and the world.
What does it mean for someone to lose belief in God? How does such an
alteration in belief about the world play out in the lives of Americans in the early 21st
century? Given the political and social relevance of the concept of God, such questions
are as pressing as they have ever been, if not more so. Conversations at the societal level
that revolve around religion in the United States, political issues especially, often are
difficult to separate from beliefs about the concept of the God of Christianity. On the
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“The biggest gains due to change in religious affiliation have been among those who say are not affiliated
with any particular faith” (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life).
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individual level, belief in God often is conceptually related to the understanding of one’s
social environment, as well as to the very existence of meaning and purpose in the world
more broadly. Also, such propositional beliefs about the world inform the determination
of appropriate (and inappropriate) courses of action. That is to say, the question of God’s
existence has direct and indirect philosophical, experiential, and practical consequences.
These consequences have become increasingly salient in light of the recent and
continuing shift away from religiosity in the U.S. population.
Recent formal dialogue between theists and atheists has commonly occurred in
polemical texts (Dawkins, The God Delusion; McGrath, The Dawkins Delusion?) or
debate-style exchanges usually held in universities, public venues or religious meeting
places. In such exchanges, atheistic thinkers typically argue for their position by citing
conflicts between modern scientific understanding and the hypothesis of God, while
theists (usually Christian) often argue for what they see as design in the universe and the
threat of moral nihilism that they believe widespread atheism would pose. The rhetoric
between the two sides of this intellectual divide often is alienating,2 unsympathetic and
divisive (Zorn). With both sides staking their claim on representing the truth about the
world (or as near as one can hope to get to truth, in the case of more nuanced atheistic
arguments), understanding, considerate remarks and affirmation of any common social
goals rarely are exchanged between the two groups. In cases where such consolations are
made, mouthpieces for the respective camps often reject them (Myers, “Officially
Disgusted”). As I will discuss in later chapters, the adherence to the divisiveness within
this public discussion is, in my view, unnecessary. The point of such discussions should
2

The late biographer, social commentator, and renowned atheist Christopher Hitchens said, “I think
religion should be treated with ridicule, hatred and contempt, and I claim that right” (Hagarty).
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be to reach common ground in some capacity, rather than simply emphasizing the
differences between groups and exacerbating any social tension between them. While
common ground should be sought and the conversation would benefit from less
contentious rhetoric, beliefs do have consequences and disagreements need not be
silenced.
Whether one believes or disbelieves in the existence of God, theological (or
atheological) propositional beliefs are not trivial. At least, they are not always so. As the
popular atheist author Sam Harris correctly notes, “A belief is a lever that, once pulled,
moves almost everything else in a person’s life…. Your beliefs define your vision of the
world; they dictate your behavior; they determine your emotional responses to other
human beings” (Harris, End of Faith 12). For example, religious beliefs help to propagate
and justify religious “rites, rituals, prayers, social institutions, holidays, etc.” (Harris et.
al., “Neural Correlates” 2). The recent atheist movement has relentlessly espoused the
fact that beliefs have consequences in their attempt to undermine belief in God and stem
what they see as the negative effects of the belief (e.g., violent religious fundamentalism,
illiberal religiously based political policies, religiously inspired pseudoscience).
However, this movement has largely ignored any emotionally difficult or undesirable
outcomes of deconversion from theism.3 Potentially emotionally negative aspects of the
experience of deconversion should have an impact on the tone and treatment of atheistic
polemics and evangelism (for lack of a better word.)
In the U.S., issues surrounding the “religion and science” debate, as it has been
termed (Dennett & Plantinga; Ecklund), are reported in various mainstream media outlets
3

The potential social difficulty of deconversion (i.e., leaving the church) is sometimes referenced, but
individual psychological distress is conspicuously absent.
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regularly, if not daily. These stories, detailing everything from controversial religious
statements made by politicians (Seelye, “Santorum Pressed”) to challenges to the free
speech rights of atheist groups (Medina, “Where Crèches Once Stood”), often directly
address the differences in perspective between those who disagree about the existence of
God. While the prevalence of news stories related to this issue shows that God belief (or
lack thereof) has effects at the social level, the tension between theism and atheism
operates on the individual level as well. As sociologist Phil Zuckerman writes, “in the
United States, where religion is vibrant and pervasive, apostasy is more controversial,
more deviant, and thus personally more intense and dramatic” (Zuckerman, Faith No
More 171, emphasis mine).
So, in exploring the deconversion process, the question of what the individual
experiences is particularly important. What, then, is the theism/atheism disagreement
really about on the individual level? This question can be interpreted in various ways
depending on the particular definition of terms being employed, and the question of
definitions will be addressed in Chapter III. However, in its most popular form, the
answer to this question is that theists and atheists disagree conceptually about the
existence of a very distinct personality. God, popularly conceived, is essentially an allpowerful, all-good, all-knowing person (usually a man), who has at least some control
over the events that transpire in the world.4 Since Freud’s early attempts at explaining
religious thought (The Future of An Illusion), those working in psychology of religion
have understood anthropomorphism as being a central characteristic of religious thinking.
Pascal Boyer, a prominent scholar in psychology of religion, has written, “That gods and

4

Other proposed definitions of “God” are considered in Chapter III.
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spirits are construed very much like persons is probably one of the best known traits of
religion” (Religion Explained 142). This anthropomorphic tendency holds true for
prominent conceptions of the Christian God as well, and it has implications for the
phenomenological (or subjective) experience of Christians who experience a
deconversion from theism.
Since God is often conceptualized as personal, God is experienced as personal for
many Christians. Obviously, the atheist position is defined by its lack of an affirmation,
or explicit denial, of this supernatural personality. The deconversion shift, then, from
Christian to atheist is a shift from believing in and experiencing a personality as present,
to disbelieving and not experiencing that same personality. The loss of God will
therefore, in many cases, be experienced as the loss of an objectively existing personality.
In other words, if one stops believing in a supernatural person (e.g., God), it is often
psychologically and phenomenologically similar to a situation in which that person was
actually present and then went away. This fact about the conceptual content and
experiential aspects of the theistic and atheistic positions, respectively, makes the
experience of death an illuminating analogy for thinking about the subjective experience
of deconversion from theism.
Throughout the following chapters, I will explore the analogy of death and
deconversion in greater depth, as well as the shift’s implications for the deconverting
individual’s view of the world. Death and deconversion both imply a reduction in the
number of active persons that the individual perceives in their environment. Given the
particular characteristics that are usually implied by the God concept (e.g., omnipotence,
omnipresence, omnibenevolence), I will argue that deconversion can have broader
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implications for one’s view of the world than the experience of human death. The shift
from Christianity to atheism has obvious implications for the deconverting individual’s
relationship to their previously held conception of God (e.g., a renegotiation of their
theory of mind, or which events in the world are potentially classified as social
interactions.) This particular re-understanding of one’s social environment, in turn, has
repercussions for teleological beliefs about the world. Although I am not attempting to set
up an anti-atheistic argument and am not presuming a theistic view, I will argue that the
potentially negative consequences of deconversion from theism should be acknowledged
and seriously engaged by those championing a scientifically informed atheism over and
against theism.
One literary work that exemplifies some of these issues is the American writer
Cormac McCarthy’s play The Sunset Limited: A Novel in Dramatic Form. In the play, an
atheistic college professor (referred to as “White”) has attempted to commit suicide by
jumping in front of a speeding train. However, a working-class religious man (referred to
as “Black”) saved White at the last moment. The play takes place inside Black’s
apartment in the aftermath of the incident. The two have an in-depth philosophical
discussion, sparked by the topic of White’s attempted suicide. Their colloquy touches on
the nature of life, meaning, and religion. In McCarthy’s particularly rich dialogic style,
the two characters reveal the underlying postures and assumptions of their respective
positions. The opening discussion between them exemplifies some of the fundamental
differences in their views of the world:
Black

So what am I supposed to do with you, Professor?

White

Why are you supposed to do anything?
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Black

I done told you. This aint none of my doin. I left out of here this
mornin to go to work you wasnt no part of my plans at all. But
here you is.

White It doesnt mean anything. Everything that happens doesnt mean
something else.
Black

Mm hm. It dont.

White

No. It doesnt.

Black

What’s it mean then?

White

It doesnt mean anything. (McCarthy 3-4, emphasis mine)

Several pages into the play, this discussion of meaning streams into a
conversation that is decidedly theological:
White

Who appointed you my guardian angel?

Black

Let me get my coat.

White

Answer the question.

Black

You know who appointed me. I didnt ask for you to leap into my
arms down in the subway this mornin.

White

I didnt leap in your arms.

Black

You didnt?

White

No. I didnt.

Black

Well how did you get there, then?

The professor stands with his head lowered. He looks at the chair and then turns
and goes and sits down in it.
Black

What. Now we aint goin?
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White

Do you really think that Jesus is in this room?

Black

No. I don't think he's in this room.

White

You dont?

Black

I know he's in this room.

The professor folds his hands at the table and lowers his head. Black pulls out the
other chair and sits again.
Black

Its the way you put it, Professor. Be like me askin you do you
think you got your coat on. You see what I’m sayin?

White

It’s not the same thing. It’s a matter of agreement. If you and I
say that I have my coat on and Cecil says that I’m naked and I
have green skin and a tail then we might want to think about
where we should put Cecil so that he wont hurt himself.
(McCarthy 9-11)

What are Black and White disagreeing about in this scene? Black sees the event
of White’s near-destruction as inherently meaningful, part of a divine mandate or plan.
White, on the other hand, views the incident as simply one more in a long chain of
occurrences, empty of inherent meaning. Many of the deeper issues and questions about
the human experience are buried within the subtext of this scene. These ideas all seem to
relate to, or result from, the characters’ disparate views on God. In this fictional case,
these contrasting worldviews motivate the characters to espouse very different values and
to see different actions as appropriate (e.g., White’s suicide, Black’s living in spite of
difficult conditions). This important and consequential disagreement obviously is not
confined to discussions between fictional characters. The dispute between those with

8

theistic and atheistic perspectives has a noteworthy impact on our world today, as much if
not more than in the conversation’s long history.
In the following chapters, we will explore how certain psychological aspects of
deconversion from theism can be thought of as phenomenologically (that is, subjectively
and experientially) similar to the experience of death as an objective socio-environmental
change. Necessitated by such a paradigm shift is a change in the number of entities to
which one ascribes mental states (i.e., theory of mind cognitions) and, consequently, in
the understanding of the scope and nature of purpose (i.e., teleological thinking.) These
shifts in theory of mind and teleological thinking are likely to intertwine and advance one
another and, in doing so, present some of the same phenomenological experiences as
does the death of someone in one’s life.

9

Chapter II: God’s Country - The Broader Relevance of God Belief
Within the covers of the Bible are all
the answers for all the problems men face.
– President Ronald Reagan
How dismal it is to see present day Americans
yearning for the very orthodoxy
that their country was founded to escape.
– Christopher Hitchens, author
Today, discussions and debates about religious issues in the U.S. are myriad. Such
conversations increasingly are fueled by the relatively recent rise in the availability of
mass communication through the internet (e.g., blogs and social networking sites). This
increase in the number of people one can readily communicate with has provided the
possibility of interaction between people of widely varied, and often conflicting,
backgrounds and worldviews. Those with contrasting opinions on politics, art, sports, and
more, are able to find others who share areas of interest or conviction and argue for their
respective viewpoints. The same is true of religious beliefs. A quick search engine visit
provides access to message boards, blogs, and other online forums dedicated exclusively
to theological discussion and debate.
Providing ease of anonymity, online communication allows less popular views to
find a voice and, in some cases, networks of supporters. Online, those with socially
unpopular viewpoints can express themselves without the threat of the social
repercussions that standard public communication would entail. The recent rise of the
online atheist movement is a perfect example. In the U.S., atheism is a view that can
engender such social repercussions. One recent study suggested that social distrust
toward atheists is comparable to distrust toward rapists (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan).
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Despite the negative view of those with atheistic beliefs, the online atheist presence has
grown significantly in the past several years. The internet, therefore, can be seen to
provide a medium that is able to reduce the threat of social stigma, and an online
presence can help to relieve this stigma in face-to-face real world interactions in
communities across the country.
As mentioned before, the differences between theistic and atheistic worldviews
often translates into disparate views on social issues and public policies. Rarely does a
day go by without a news story involving religious groups seeking political or social
actions that seem inappropriate to atheists, and even religious secularists. For example, in
June of 2012, Mayor Tim Yates of Monroe County, TN began displaying the Ten
Commandments in the county courthouse alongside other “historical documents,” such as
the U.S. Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence. While the mayor’s office
has said the display is not religious, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, an
organization working to protect separation of church and state, called the display
“unconstitutional” (Henry, “10 Commandments”). This story is one of the increasingly
frequent examples of the clash between those who believe Christianity has a place in U.S.
governmental institutions and those who are, or represent, atheists and secularists.
The U.S. is increasingly religiously diverse and much of this diversity comes from
people disaffiliating with those religious groups to which they previously belonged. In
fact, those citing “None/No Religion,” “Atheist,” and “Agnostic” collectively accounted
for 16.6% of the U.S. population in the 2008 American Religious Identification Survey
(Kosmin & Keysar). And as of 2012, 5% of those in the U.S. identify as “convinced
atheist[s]” (WIN-Gallup International 15). At the other end of the spectrum, one reason
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that religious beliefs have such a pronounced effect on political affiliations and opinions
about social issues is the influence of the movement known as the Religious Right, a
conservative born-again Christian movement that has been vocal and politically active for
the past several decades.

Born-Again Christian Theism and U.S. Society

When discussing Protestant Christianity in the United States, terminology can be
confusing. Terms such as “evangelical,” “fundamentalist,” “Pentecostal,” “conservative,”
“charismatic,” and “Bible-believing” often refer to overlapping but potentially distinct
groupings of people adhering to certain theological belief systems or aligning with
particular religious organizations and networks. For reasons touched upon below, these
indistinctly used terms can even reference people who have a set of specific conservative
political affiliations. For my purposes, I will use the term “born-again Christians” to refer
to “pentecostal and charismatic as well as fundamentalist and evangelical Protestants who
mobilized politically and culturally [beginning] in the 1980s” (Harding xvi, emphasis
mine).
The famous Scopes Trial of 1925 may have been a legal victory for Biblicalliteralist Protestants, but the trial also entailed a “cultural verdict,” which deemed
fundamentalist Christianity as “a rigid, homogeneous thing stuck in the past” (Harding
62). The Scopes trial and the increasingly secular nature of what was considered
appropriate in American public life helped launch several decades during which Biblicalliteralist Protestants disengaged from conversations in the American public sphere.
During this time, many predicted a future of ever-growing secularity and decreasing
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organizational religiosity. This view became known as the “secularization hypothesis”
and was embraced by many philosophers and other thinkers who focus on the
sociological aspects of religion.
In the early 1980s, however, a shift occurred in American Protestant Christianity.
With the rise of organizations such as the “Moral Majority, the Religious Roundtable,
and Christian Voice” (Harding 79), Protestant Christianity became highly politically
engaged. Politically active organizations designed to promote born-again Christian
values, which are usually synonymous with socially conservative politics, became
prevalent. The anthropologist Susan Harding, in her seminal work The Book of Jerry
Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics, notes that the born-again movement that
began three decades ago “broke through the array of cultural barriers that had quarantined
[born-again Christians] from other Americans for half a century” (79). In other words,
born-again groups in the 1980s began to view their religious beliefs as having very
distinct political implications. Counter to the claims of those espousing the secularization
hypothesis, this politically active strand of born-again Christianity is still highly
politically relevant in the United States three decades after its initial development.
The continuance of this born-again Christian political activism can be seen in
news reports on an almost daily basis.5 The groups that represent the born-again Christian
viewpoint are often associated with anti-gay rights, anti-abortion, and pro-creationism
education stances. Currently active born-again Christian organizations such as Focus on
the Family,6 Rock For Life,7 and The Discovery Institute8 exist in order to advance

5

For example, today as I am writing, a quick search of the headlines provides a story in which two bornagain politicians who formerly ran for the presidency are attempting to rally support for a private company
that recently voiced its opposition to the legalization of gay marriage (Brumfield).
6
focusonthefamily.com
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politically the aforementioned positions, respectively. The expansive funding and social
capital that born-again Christian values and groups hold in the United States ensures that
any public conversation in which the born-again Christian worldview is engaged,
especially a conversation in which the view is being challenged, will be highly politically
charged.
This born-again Christianity is not only politically relevant, however. Obviously,
it is also personally significant to millions of believers. The theology that draws bornagain Christians into the public square is the same theology that makes the analogy with
death appropriate when discussing deconversion from theism. As I will discuss in detail
in Chapter IV, the aspect of born-again theology that is most pertinent to this approach to
deconversion is its anthropomorphic and relational nature. Politically charged born-again
Christianity typically espouses a personal concept of God, who is often seen as morally
and politically opinionated, to which believers can relate. Various recent polling suggests
that the personally accessible God of born-again Christianity is significant to millions in
the U.S. In fact, “at least a quarter of all Americans follow a faith in which the Christian
god is understood to be intimately and personally present” (Luhrmann, When God Talks
Back 15). In a 2005 Newsweek poll, 75% of respondents said forging “a personal
relationship with God” was “very important to their religious practices” (Beliefnet.com).
This God is not relevant to all Americans, however.

7
8

rockforlife.org
discovery.org
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Atheism, Non-religiosity and U.S. Society

As mentioned previously, atheism is not a popular worldview in the U.S. and is
often treated with suspicion and social distrust. By some indications, however, the U.S.
population’s wariness toward atheism has decreased over the past few years. For
example, a majority of Americans (54%) said in a June 2012 Gallup poll that they would
vote for a well-qualified atheistic presidential candidate. That number is up from 40% in
1978 and 49% in 1999 (Jones, “Atheists, Muslims See Most Bias”). This slight
improvement in the public acceptance of atheistic Americans still leaves their presidential
prospects dead last in comparison to the other minorities mentioned in the Gallup poll.
The slowly growing level of tolerance for those with atheistic worldviews certainly is
correlated with the increase in atheistic organizations, which are making their voices
heard in the current public conversation.
The Secular Student Alliance, a college and high school student group that works
to promote “science, reason and free inquiry” (“A Brief History of the Secular Student
Alliance”), now has over 230 local chapters in the U.S. In 2003 they claimed only 42
groups (Zuckerman, Faith No More 4). This recent rapid growth is especially impressive
considering that this subset of Americans were considered “few in number – and not an
organized or self-conscious group” as recently as 2006 (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann
214). The massive sales of now-famous (or infamous) atheist polemics in the early
2000’s brought atheism to the forefront of American social discourse and were
particularly relevant in light of the religiously inspired attacks of September 11, 2001.
Oft-cited examples of such works include biologist Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion
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(2006), philosopher Sam Harris’ The End of Faith (2004), and political journalist
Christopher Hitchens’ God is Not Great (2007).
Another reason for the slowly increasing acceptance for atheists in America may
be, as was mentioned before, the fact that more people in America identify as nonreligious, atheist or agnostic than they have in the past (Pew Forum on Religion & Public
Life; WIN-Gallup International). However, rather than only being a cause of increased
acceptance, this shift in religious affiliation may also be an effect. In other words, the
increase in reported non-religiosity may result as much from the perceived social
acceptance and freedom to report one’s beliefs in such a way, as it does from shifts in the
privately held convictions of individuals.
While the new atheist movement that is “self-conscious” and “organized” is
certainly limited to the last decade, atheism as a worldview and philosophical outlook
stretches back into human history at least as far as ancient Greece, where the term
“atheos,” the etymological root of the word “atheist,” was born (Bremmer 22). For more
than two millennia afterward, “atheist” was used as a pejorative term for one’s
ideological adversaries, but found its first well known use as a positive self-description
by the 18th century French philosopher Denis Diderot. The fact that in the 18th and 19th
centuries the term was associated with “immorality and lawlessness…. led those who
were unable to subscribe to orthodox theism to coin new terms of self-definition, which
would allow them to remain uncontaminated by the stigma of atheism.”9

9

Indeed, even today the term “atheist” retains some of its condemning sting, especially in more culturally
religious areas of the U.S. One distinctive feature of the recently budding atheist subculture is that the
movement has largely embraced the “atheist” designation and attempted to spin the term as a positive title,
or at least an accepted one (Hyman 30).
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The 20th century, particularly the last several decades, saw a “‘radical
godlessness’ that was, by world historical standards, unique” (Hyman 32). Why the last
decades of the 20th century should be fertile ground for a rise in atheism is beyond the
scope of this work, but has been discussed at length elsewhere (Barrett, Why Would
Anyone Believe in God? 115-118). Nevertheless, it is clear that “Christians in latetwentieth-century and early-twenty-first-century America… live in a world in which it is
entirely possible to take for granted that talk of the supernatural is bunk…. Faith has
become more self-conscious; doubt of the idea of the supernatural itself hovers as a
plausible reality. And what it is to believe has changed” (Luhrmann, When God Talks
Back 319). Just as American Christianity has changed dramatically in the past several
decades, so has American atheism.
“Atheism” as a newly relevant social identification is struggling to find its
parameters and define itself within current public conversations. As atheism and nonreligiosity become more prominent, academics have only begun to look into this
previously ignored area of potential intellectual exploration. Sociologist Phil Zuckerman,
in his book Faith No More: Why People Reject Religion, discusses the statistically
common characteristics of those who disaffect from religion. Using the word “apostates”
to refer to non-religious individuals, Zuckerman writes:
…from the handful of sporadic studies that have appeared over the past
50 years, certain findings have been consistently reported. For example,
apostasy rates are higher among men than women. Apostates are also
more likely to be left-leaning politically than non-apostates. Finally,
apostates are more likely to be better educated, to get higher grades, and to
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describe themselves as having an ‘intellectual orientation’ than their
religious peers. (Zuckerman, Faith No More 10)
Many reasons for these likely attributes of the non-religious have been discussed
elsewhere, and some will be touched upon later in this work.10

Culture Wars: Christianity and Atheism in the U.S.
The last few decades of the 20th century and the first several years of the 21st
century in the U.S. have, as we have seen, marked an intensification in the political and
social clout of both born-again Christianity and self-proclaimed atheism and nonreligiosity. While the born-again Christian movement may be interpreted as partially
reactionary to the “age of atheism” (Hyman 32) of the later 1900’s, the even more recent
atheist movement is certainly also, in part, reactionary to the social and political
conservatism, as well as the theocratic leanings, of the Religious Right. Regardless of the
respective social and political factors that have allowed these movements to flourish,
their opposing views and rhetorics are increasingly politically relevant. This is especially
true considering that the “Nones,” “atheists,” and “agnostics” are collectively the second
largest religious demographic, behind the various types of Christianity counted
collectively (Kosmin & Keysar).
As mentioned before, online communication has enabled discussions between the
religious and the non-religious with a frequency and immediacy that was not available in
years past. Using mass communication for conversing about personally held convictions
is a double-edged sword, however. While online communication provides the possibility
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of easily accessible and potentially meaningful dialogue across worldviews, it is obvious
that such communication often quickly devolves into unnecessary hostility, exclusivism
and demonizing. As a July 2012 article in Scientific American puts it, “A perfect storm of
factors come together to engender the rudeness and aggression seen in the comments
sections of Web pages.” Paraphrasing psychology professor Dr. Art Markman, the article
continues:
First, commenters are often virtually anonymous, and thus, unaccountable
for their rudeness. Second, they are at a distance from the target of their
anger — be it the article they’re commenting on or another comment on
that article — and people tend to antagonize distant abstractions more
easily than living, breathing interlocutors. Third, it’s easier to be nasty in
writing than in speech, hence the now somewhat outmoded practice of
leaving angry notes (back when people used paper) (Wolchover & Life’s
Little Mysteries)
This problem, inherent to much internet communication, is operating in online
discussions between the religious and the non-religious. The fact that these beliefs
regarding the nature and operation of the world are of practical import makes the
emotionally-charged nature of the online mediums through which many of these
conversations take place more than simply a problem of impoliteness or hurt feelings.
Current debates about climate change are an excellent example. Theological beliefs have
a direct effect on popular belief about human-caused climate change and the appropriate
course of action in response to such change. Born-again Christian Americans are less
likely than the general population to believe in human caused climate change and are
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more likely to see it as “not a problem” (Pew Research Center for the People & the
Press). This is not coincidental. As with all beliefs, born-again Christian beliefs have
practical implications. Those attempting to broaden the public understanding of humancaused climate change would be well advised to understand the religious dimension of
the issue. As an article in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society puts it:
Skepticism about anthropogenic climate change may… be reasonable
when viewed through the lens of religion…. To create a lasting public
understanding of anthropogenic climate change, scientists and educators
need to appreciate that the very notion that humans can directly change the
climate may conflict with beliefs that underpin the culture of the audience.
(Donner 1297-1298)
Beliefs about how one’s social or physical environment functions, then, are of
immediate practical importance. If the Christian God really does control the environment,
then public policy aimed at reducing greenhouse gasses are, at best, a waste of energy,
money and resources, and at worst, a symptom of faithlessness. This is why, as the article
cited above states, the values that born-again Christians often hold are “reasonable when
viewed through the lens of religion.” So, considering that a majority of Americans
believe in God, miracles, heaven, Jesus as the Son of God, virgin birth, the Devil, and
angels (Zuckerman, Faith No More 21), the boundary between the values of the religious
and those of the non-religious is of paramount importance. Understanding the effects of
both theistic and atheistic beliefs on individuals and understanding the experience of
those individuals who cross from supernatural theism into atheism is similarly crucial.
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More than just abstract fodder for intellectual dinner party discussions, beliefs are
“part of the very apparatus of your mind, determining your desires, fears, expectations,
and subsequent behavior” (Harris, End of Faith 12). Beliefs shape how we interpret our
experience of the world. This is why they are so socially implicative. If, as I have
suggested, deconversion from theism is potentially phenomenologically and
psychologically similar to the experience of the death of someone in one’s life, this fact
will be important for the approach of atheistic polemicists and the broader religious
conversation. But before discussing deconversion’s similarities to death, we must explore
what the term “deconversion” refers to. While one’s beliefs about concepts such as God,
religion, and atheism are extremely important, these concepts themselves are often
amorphous and difficult to define. What does it mean to “believe in God”? What is
“atheism”? These and other questions are addressed in the following chapter.
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Chapter III: Help Thou Mine Unbelief - Definitions and Common
Causes of Deconversion
If we could only succeed in moving theism aside,
then other avenues for exploring God might
open up before our eyes. – Bishop John Shelby Spong
If God is not some kind of supernatural entity,
then who knows whether you or I believe in him (it?)?
….When it comes to God… there is no straightforward way of cutting
through the fog of misunderstanding to arrive at a consensus
about the topic under consideration.
– Daniel C. Dennett, philosopher
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
– Ludwig Wittgenstein, philosopher
Before attempting to provide a useful interpretation of the deconversion
experience, it is necessary to elaborate on functional definitions of the relevant terms.
Unsurprisingly, many of the qualitative and intuitive terms utilized in the study of
religion, including “religion” itself, do not readily suggest clear-cut definitional
boundaries. It should go without saying that the following discussions about the
meanings of terms are not intended to be exhaustive, only adequate. While sufficient and
succinct declarative definitions may not be available, attempting to limit the vagaries of
the significant words to some extent will help to clarify the essence of my argument and
reduce the number of objections and critiques that might arise due to preventable
misunderstandings.
First, what is “religion?” The term “religion” originated in a Judeo-Christian
framework and “still has its clearest application in this context” (Martin 217). This fact,
which is often problematic when exploring non-Western religious traditions, should pose
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little problem within the context of this work. Religions typically feature ritualistic
behavior, implications for social group hierarchy and formation, sacred texts, and
behavioral prescriptions for adherents. These factors are present within American bornagain Christianity as well. However, the primacy apportioned to the literal belief of
doctrinal propositions by most born-again Christians will underlie any use of the term
“religion” within this paper. Without belief, the other aspects of born-again Christianity
are viewed, by many Christians, as insufficient.11
Like the term “religion,” other words employed in debates and discussions
between the religious and the non-religious, such as “God,” “theism,” “atheism,” and
even “science,” are difficult to define. Who counts as an “atheist?” Who counts as a
“theist?” How do we decide? The popular Christian author and pastor Rob Bell writes in
his book Love Wins, “Often times when I meet atheists and we talk about the god they
don’t believe in, we quickly discover that I don’t believe in that god, either” (Bell 9).
Statements like this one reveal the elusiveness inherent within the issue of determining
God-belief.
Given the various plausible nuances of the terms and even in light of the attempt
at definitional clarification that follows, “theism” and “atheism” should be considered
opposite ends on a spectrum, rather than mutually exclusive binary oppositions. As Phil
Zuckerman writes of his experience interviewing those who have disaffected from
religion, “apostasy does not always result in the embracing of absolute, convinced
atheism” (Zuckerman 2012, 151). In other words, the terms “theism” and “atheism” are
approximations, rather than absolutes. Obviously, in the context of this work,
11

This emphasis on belief is evidenced in the examples of clergy whose jobs have been threatened due to a
shift in nothing more than propositional beliefs (Worth; Hagerty “From Minister to Atheist”).
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“deconversion” refers to an individual’s shift from theism to atheism. But, what does that
mean?

Starting Point: Theism

The term “theism,” within this work, will refer to worldviews that affirm the
objective existence of God. While some Christians believe that the concept of God is
useful in a metaphoric, symbolic or interpretive sense, I will use the term “theist” to refer
only to those individuals who ascribe to God an objective and human-independent
existence. This belief in God as objectively real is virtually ubiquitous within American
born-again Christianity.12 This somewhat clears up the intention of the term “theism.”
But, even ascribing to theists the belief that God is objectively real, the question remains
as to the appropriate use or meaning of the term “God.” What do theists believe is
objectively real?
In their article exploring the experiences of preachers who no longer believe,
Daniel Dennett and Linda LaScola fittingly describe the range of theological possibilities:
A spectrum of available conceptions of God can be put in rough order,
with frank anthropomorphism at one extreme – a God existing in time and
space with eyes and hands and love and anger – through deism, a
somehow still personal God who cares but is nevertheless outside time and
space and does not intervene, and the still more abstract Ground of all
Being, from which (almost?) all anthropomorphic features have been

12

The belief is also held by a vast majority of Americans in general (Newport, “More Than 9 in 10”).
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removed, all the way to frank atheism: nothing at all is aptly called God.
(Dennett & LaScola 124)
These differing meanings to which the word “God” may be attached all find expression
within American Christianity. Rival conceptions of God may even be found within the
same church building unbeknownst to church members, as most communities and
services do not rely heavily on consensus about theological nuances.13
In When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship
with God, an extensive study about American Christianity, psychological anthropologist
T.M. Luhrmann notes that what born-again Christianity has seen “in the last four or five
decades is the democratization of God” (35). Believers, Luhrmann says, are determining
and defining their theology for themselves (at least more so than in the past), rather than
having it decided for them by the church hierarchy. This distinctly Protestant feature has
been the source of innumerable splits among denominations due to disagreements about
any number of theological details. But while there are many ideas of God on offer in the
religious marketplace, some wildly divergent, born-again Christians usually agree about
God sufficiently for communication and the recognition that the God concept is similar
among them.
Behind the scenes of popular Christian teaching and services, philosophical
theology often engages the idea of God in sophisticated and counterintuitive ways. The
philosopher Robert McCauley claims that such theological doctrinal interpretations are
highly counterintuitive. He writes, “Theology is one of the few academic undertakings

13

“Many people are utterly comfortable with this curious ignorance; it just doesn’t matter to them what the
formulas mean that their churches encourage them to recite. Some churches are equally tolerant of the
indeterminacy: as long as you ‘have faith’ or are ‘one with Jesus’ (whatever you think that means) your
metaphysical convictions are your own business” (Dennett and LaScola 124).
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that can result in formulations that are very nearly as distant from and as obscure to
humans’ common understandings of the world as the most esoteric theoretical proposals
of science are” (McCauley, Why Religion is Natural 212). For example, the theologian
Paul Tillich writes, “if God encounters man God is neither object nor subject and is
therefore above the scheme into which theism has placed him” (Tillich 187). Theological
conceptions of this kind are not easily spread into the everyday thinking of born-again
Christians regarding God. Lay-believers may profess some counterintuitive theological
propositions within the Christian creeds and statements of belief,14 but otherwise, such
philosophical theology has little impact on popular thought about God. Like most popular
thought regarding God, born-again Christians typically cluster around the more
anthropomorphic side of the theological spectrum. For this reason, I will not focus on the
various conceptions of God provided by philosophical theologians except insofar as such
conceptions may play a role in the deconversion experience in question.
Evolutionary psychologist Justin L. Barrett, in his influential book Why Would
Anyone Believe in God?, discusses the likelihood of anthropomorphizing one’s concept
of God, regardless of one’s reflectively stated theological beliefs. Describing the results
of a series of experiments that he conducted, Barrett writes:
People’s reflective beliefs about God fairly closely matched the exotic
theological properties many world religions embrace and teach. When
these same individuals recalled or paraphrased sketchy accounts of God’s
activities, however, they systematically misremembered God as having

14

For example, “[God] is an infinite, unchangeable Spirit, perfect in holiness, wisdom, goodness, justice,
power and love. From all eternity He exists as the One Living and True God in three persons of one
substance, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, equal in power and glory” (VineyardUSA, “What We
Believe”).
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human properties in contradiction to these theological ones. (Barrett, Why
Would Anyone Believe in God? 10)
Potential explanations for this tendency toward “theological incorrectness”(McCauley
219) will be discussed later.15 For now, it is enough to note that people, born-again
Christians included, are inclined to think of God in human terms.
In fact, born-again Christianity often freely embraces the anthropomorphized
concept of God and makes little attempt to explicitly reconcile any counterintuitive
theological claims that contradict this anthropomorphization.16 For the purpose of this
work, then, the term “God” will refer to the concept of the objectively existent
superhuman personality believed to have created the world, who is relational and actively
present, and who born-again Christians identify both as Jesus Christ and as the God of the
Christian scriptures.

Destination: Atheism

Since a workable approximation of the word “God” has been provided, the term
“atheism” could simply mean either lack of belief or disbelief in this concept. However,
there are a few problems with taking this approach. One problem is that such a definition
of “atheism” is only a negation. And while the morphology of the word doesn’t suggest
positive content, in order to speak about deconversion, some suggestion as to the
deconverting individual’s endpoint is needed. Additionally, within the current atheist
movement in the United States, when someone identifies as an “atheist,” they often mean
more than simply to negate the definition of “God” that I have provided above. Jains and
15
16

Chapter V.
Discussed in detail in Chapter IV.
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Buddhists, for example, would most likely disbelieve in the aforementioned God. But
when referring to someone as an “atheist” within the context of the public conversation
between the religious and the non-religious in the U.S., one rarely means that the person
so described is a Jain or a Buddhist. Moreover, even some of the more liberal Christian
theologies could be termed “atheism,” if the term simply referred to the rejection of the
given definition of God.17
Referring to atheism in terms of the currently accepted connotation, I will follow
the example of the most famous (infamous?) figurehead of the New Atheism movement,
Richard Dawkins. In The God Delusion, his bestselling book promoting atheism,
professor Dawkins deals with the question of the definitions, using the term “atheism” as
a synonym for philosophical naturalism. He writes, “An atheist in this sense of
philosophical naturalist is somebody who believes there is nothing beyond the natural,
physical world, no supernatural creative intelligence lurking behind the observable
universe, no soul that outlasts the body and no miracles – except in the sense of natural
phenomena that we don’t yet understand” (Dawkins 14). In this sense, atheism entails
certain positive beliefs about where the boundaries of reality lie and the nature of the
contents of reality, namely, that all reality is ultimately physical. This narrower definition
will be of use in avoiding possible confusion regarding non-theistic, but still supernatural
or otherwise non-scientifically informed worldviews. I will not consider such views
atheistic.

17

Such liberal (i.e., less-anthropomorphic) theology may be seen as a potential transitional stage prior to
atheism for the deconverting individual, as is discussed in Chapter V.
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Common Causes of Deconversion:
Involuntariness, Personality, and Conceptual Aspects
Now that we have considered the content of the deconversion experience, we
come to the question of causes. What could cause someone to deconvert from theism?
One can imagine any number of reasons an individual might leave a particular religious
community. Marriage into another religious tradition, moving away from one’s
community, personal or political disputes, differing religious needs, and even disliking
the style of music during services, are all potential reasons for leaving a religious
community. One thing is clear about these reasons. They are, to a greater or lesser extent,
voluntary. In the American religious landscape, people choose to leave religious
institutions and organizations, even if some may feel compelled by various
circumstances.
However, regardless of church attendance, the changing of one’s belief as in the
deconversion experience, is often involuntary. Those who become atheists are often
unable to continue believing in the various supernatural claims presented by their
previously held religious tradition. Both theism and atheism are “cognitive models or
representations of the physical, biological, and social worlds” (Feist 86), with the
distinguishing feature being the use/non-use of the concept of a supernatural God. Such
theories, or mental representations of how the world functions, are means of “interpreting
and organizing sensory experience” (87) and, as such, are weakened by any experiences
that contradict the theory or any of the known implications of the theory.
Psychologist of science Gregory Feist describes the epitomic scientific thinker as
“one who is most likely to confront inconsistent evidence and ultimately, if the evidence
stands, change or modify theory to incorporate the new evidence” (96). The pattern of
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changing theory to fit with available experiential evidence, rather than vice versa, can be
seen in many cases of those who have deconverted, which affirms the association of
atheism with a scientifically informed worldview and illuminates the common born-again
Christian aversion to science. In addition to being unable to choose the effects of
evidence upon one’s view of the world, new evidence that pertains to one’s worldview
often comes, at least initially, unsolicited. For example, daily news reports of human
suffering need not be sought out for the purpose of testing one’s theological beliefs, but
the potential of such reports to undermine popular conceptions of a loving God is
obvious.
Many born-again Christians espouse a position known as “voluntarism” in regard
to peoples’ theories about the world. Voluntarism is the claim that one chooses one’s
beliefs about the world. Though unconvincing, this assessment of the nature of belief is a
logical necessity within the context of the broader born-again Christian worldview. If
faith in God is a virtue and the lack of faith is a vice, then it must be possible to hold the
atheist (or other theological offender) personally accountable for her lack of belief. In
order to hold the atheist responsible for her lack of belief, belief itself must be of a
voluntary nature, rather than being something that is constrained by the person’s given
experience and thought. This voluntarism can be seen in the words of popular born-again
mega-church pastor Rick Warren. He writes, “People become atheists because of hurt,
then seek intellectual arguments to validate their desire to live without God” (Rick
Warren, rickwarren). However, much evidence counters such voluntaristic assessments.
For example, in their interview-and-questionnaire-based study of people who
were raised religious and became irreligious after childhood, psychologists Bob
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Altemeyer and Bruce Hunsberger found that the inability to affirm certain concepts was
often a cause of adulthood deconversion. They summarized their interviews:
The problems that came up most often in most students’ minds (i.e., what
happens to us when we die, the death of a loved one, or the problem of
evil – arguably emotional issues) seldom came up first in the minds of
budding [apostates]. Instead, the things that bothered them tended to arise
in the realm of ideas…. [They] were working from a different page than
most other teenagers were. They were examining the truth of their
religion. (Altemeyer & Hunsberger 112-113)
Evidence of the involuntary nature of deconversion from theism is also found in
the fact that many of those who deconvert do not desire to disbelieve. Atheist and former
born-again Christian missionary Kenneth Daniels writes of his personal longing to
believe:
If I could patch things up by forcing myself to believe again, I would do so
in a heartbeat. Unfortunately I have tried that several times, only to be
besieged again by doubt, and come to the conclusion that attempting to
will myself to believe that which in my heart I do not believe is futile. In
this struggle I am not alone; millions of others have passed through the
valley of the shadow of doubt finding themselves unable to return to the
pastures of faith, despite repeated appeals to God to restore their faith.
(Daniels 4)
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Many, perhaps most, of those who deconvert do not wish to believe again. But, the fact
that some do wish to believe18 reveals the involuntary nature of one’s interpretation of the
world.
The likelihood that a person will feel the need to reconcile her theory of the world
with the challenging available evidence (i.e., the likelihood that a person will think
scientifically) may partially have its roots in the individual’s personality. For example, in
Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s study of those who changed their religious orientation in
adulthood (i.e., religious to non-religious, or vice versa), they found that those who
became religious scored significantly higher than the average on the Right-Wing
Authoritarianism scale, a scale that measures tendencies toward being an “authoritarian
follower” (Altemeyer & Hunsberger 106). “Such persons submit to established
authorities more than normal, tend to attack others in the name of authority, and stick to
social conventions more than most people do” (106). On the other hand, those in the
study who had become non-religious were “decidedly unauthoritarian”(106).
Gregory Feist expounds additional evidence that suggests certain personality
correlates with tendencies toward scientific interest and thought. While this evidence
focuses on those who are either professional scientists or students of science, it is relevant
to the discussion of deconversion in that professional scientists are more likely to be
atheistic than the general population (Ecklund 15-16). Several personality traits correlate
with having a lower “threshold for being interested in or having a career in science”
(Feist 117). For example, cognitive traits such as “conscientiousness”19 and “openness to

18

Zuckerman quotes an atheist he interviewed, “As deeply as I missed my faith, as hard as I tried to keep
it, my head could not command my gut. I know now that it was wishful thinking, not truth” (Zuckerman,
Faith No More 90).
19
“…that is, their desire for order, organization, and punctuality” (Feist 117).
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experience”20 are found at higher levels among scientists than in nonscientists. Socially,
scientists “relative to nonscientists, do prefer to be alone and are somewhat less social
and less affiliative…. [they] have relatively low thresholds of social stimulation, and
therefore solitary activity of small group interactions are ideal” (118). These summations
of the personality traits of scientists are obviously only statistical averages. Still, they
suggest both a personality dimension of scientific interest and thought and a potential
personality dimension of irreligiosity and atheism.
Conceptually, there are many elements of a traditional theistic view that may
undermine belief in God, specifically within born-again Christianity. For example, the
doctrine of hell, the problem of evil, and scriptural descriptions of God’s actions that are
judged to be immoral, all may challenge the perceived legitimacy of the concept of God.
Interestingly, such beliefs are often seen as a package, rather than considered separately.
When someone is unable to reconcile their religious tradition’s view of God with the
suffering in the world, for example, they rarely simply begin to believe that God is
perfectly content with such suffering. Rather, it is more common to abandon the concept
of God altogether.21 The fact of the cohesiveness of inter-related religious ideas, such as
God, hell, and heaven supports the view of religious beliefs as comprehensive theories or
worldviews, which are abandoned by deconverts in the face of contradicting evidence.
Not all of those who deconvert engage with the foundational theological ideas of the
religion they are rejecting, but some certainly do. In fact, individuals sometimes “[begin]
their journey at the heart of the matter, wondering if God really exists” (Altemeyer &
20

“…being willing to admit when you may be wrong once the evidence shows this to be the case” (Feist
117).
21
In Faith No More, Zuckerman discusses the pseudonymously referenced “Milton” and his deconversion.
Milton began to believe that the concept of hell was “manifestly inhumane,” and this was the “first domino
to fall” in Milton’s journey to professed atheism (Zuckerman, Faith No More 143).
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Hunsberger 111). For some, the large religious questions regarding “the deep, profound
matters that give life meaning” (20) are defining and of the utmost personal importance.

The Potential Emotional Importance of God-belief

Deconversions from theism are as multifaceted as any human experience. Thus,
they may be experienced either as mild or as transformative,22 depending on the
individual’s feeling about the importance or centrality of God belief. Belief in God is not
always experienced as something central to the life of the deconverting individual and in
such instances the shift to atheism is rather experientially mundane. Such deconversions
can be termed “mild.” Often, especially in more religious cultures, belief in God is
foundational to one’s experience of the world, especially if one has made sizeable
personal investments of time, energy or resources to endeavors that assume the existence
of God. When belief in God has been an important part of an individual’s life up until the
shift to atheism, the individual has experienced a “transformative” deconversion.
Transformative deconversions entail a “personal revolution, a life-altering
transformation,” and involve “a massive psychological reorientation from a religious to a
secular worldview” (Zuckerman, Faith No More 7). Setting aside mild deconversion,
which is by definition relatively personally unimportant, the analogy with death that is
expounded in the remainder of this work will be oriented toward understanding the
experience of transformative deconversion.
Another useful analogy that illuminates transformative psychological change of
any kind, including deconversion, is the “web of belief” model for understanding
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Terminology adapted from Zuckerman, Faith No More.
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worldview shifts.23 Philosopher Owen Flanagan, in his book The Problem of the Soul,
provides a succinct explanation of the web-of-belief model. Flanagan writes:
The point is that different beliefs involve different degrees of personal
investment…. When the web’s periphery is damaged, repair is simple.
When the center is damaged… I may have to rebuild from scratch. I may
need to move and build a new web elsewhere. Some kinds of damage to
an existing conceptual-conative scheme [that is, web of belief] may be
easily fixed, other kinds of damage, depending on how close to the center
they hit, are more costly. (Flanagan, Problem of the Soul 35)
Transformative deconversions can be thought of as those deconversions where the
concept of God is “close to the center” of the person’s web of belief.
Transformative deconversion obviously implies that the individual really believed
in God beforehand. Certainly, many who are religiously affiliated affirm religious
doctrines simply for social, moral, or other personal reasons. Not all people who attend
churches and profess the creeds believe in God or even care about such cosmic or
metaphysical religious questions. But, individuals who undergo the transition from true
and invested belief to true disbelief experience a powerful shift in their experience of the
world. This brings us to the question that will drive the rest of this work: Is there a
subjective experiential difference between a change in one’s worldview and a change in
one’s world? In regard to the topic at hand, is there a phenomenological similarity
between deconversion and living in a world in which God was truly there and then truly
went away? These two circumstances, I will argue, are not as different as we might
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The logician Willard Van Orman Quine originally suggested this model.
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initially suppose. People’s theories about the world are an important and influential
backdrop for all of their experiences. When one’s theory about the world changes, I will
argue, one’s world changes, at least phenomenologically. “Theories organize our
observations of the world; in fact, we could not perceive without them” (Feist 97).
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Chapter IV: Where is God Gone? – The Death of God as a
Phenomenological Reality
I had hoped that the heart of reality might be of such a kind that we can best symbolize it
as a place; instead, I found it to be a Person. – C.S. Lewis
Unlike skepticism or naturalism, Christian faith is not simply an assent to propositional
truths; it is a commitment to the person of Jesus. - Kenneth Daniels, former born-again
Christian missionary
There is one and only one living and true God. He is an intelligent, spiritual, and
personal Being, the Creator, Redeemer, Preserver, and Ruler of the universe. – The
Baptist Faith and Message, creed of belief professed by the Southern Baptist Convention
Since we have established the socio-cultural context in which the type of
deconversion being explored takes place and the fact that deconversion, so defined,
involves particular involuntary conceptual shifts in a person’s worldview that are
potentially experienced as emotionally impactful, we now turn to the question of the ways
in which deconversion may be analogous to the experience of death. In this chapter, we
will explore the personal and interactive nature of many born-again Christians’
relationships with God and will discover that they are often best thought of as
psychologically real relationships. In light of this fact, when the relationship is terminated
through the deconversion process, God is experienced as truly going away, or dying.
While anthropomorphic language is often used to some extent when discussing God, it is
obvious that not all conceptions of God, when disbelieved, are experienced as death. The
extent to which the anthropomorphic language is literally believed will be the deciding
factor in how the believer experiences God. As was previously mentioned, born-again
Christians usually affirm very anthropomorphized conceptions of God. So the politically
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influential God and the God who dies via deconversion are often the same. First, then, we
will explore how believers experience the person-like God of born-again Christianity.

God, The Person

For born-again Christians in the U.S., God is real, present and active. Every week
believers fill churches expecting more than just coffee, community, music, ritual and
morals in the form of sermons. Those aspects of church services are inarguably
important. For many believers, however, these are not the ultimate reasons for attending
church services. Many churchgoers desire and expect to directly experience the presence
of God. God is, for these believers, “intimate, personal, and supernaturally present”
(Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 13). Conceiving of God in this way is clearly
consistent with a literal reading of the Christian Bible, in which God is represented as an
external personality who interacts with many people including Abraham (Today’s New
International Version Bible, Gen. 15) and Moses (Exodus 3 & 19). And for born-again
Christians, Jesus of Nazareth represents the ultimate anthropomorphic manifestation of
God. Interestingly, God is not only thought of and talked about in these person-like ways,
he24 is experienced as person-like.
Tanya Luhrmann recounts various experiences with born-again Christians in
which they described their relationships with God as being real to them. They “pray to a
God with whom they communicate directly and clearly” (Luhrmann “God as the
Ground,” 19). And they experience God as responding. One of Luhrmann’s interviewees,
pseudonymously named “Sam,” came to feel God as “sensorily” present. Luhrmann
24

Throughout this work, the pronoun “he” is used when referring to God because within born-again
Christianity God is usually conceived as male.
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quotes Sam, writing, “It’s kind of weird, but walking down the street randomly, making
up songs no one’s ever heard of, and just singing to him – it makes me feel so wonderful
to know that he’s listening and walking right beside me…. You know beyond a shadow
of a doubt that somebody is there with you” (When God Talks Back 148-149).
Luhrmann’s study is full of similar reports of personal experiences of God.
These personal experiences with God are promoted and encouraged, Luhrmann
argues, through prayer and church services. She writes:
[Born-again Christians] speak about ‘getting to know’ God, learning who
he is, talking to him about their day. They describe God and Jesus as
people you need to meet personally, as if you were out for coffee and had
to figure out what the person across the table from you really meant. As
one congregant said, ‘It’s just like any relationship. If I had a best friend
and we never hung out, where would our friendship be?’ (When God Talks
Back 48)
One Christian in the study even reports that she sometimes “laughs out loud when she’s
praying. She says [God is] her best friend” (70). The born-again Christian God is still
seen as the all-knowing, everlasting and powerful creator of the Universe, but he is also
understood to be intimately close with believers. The title of “best friend” is often used
(Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 5-6, 48, 70, 116, 195).
The believer, however, does not simply decide that God is her best friend and
subsequently have realistic experiences with God. These experiences are usually
cultivated through individual or communal interaction with God. In fact, many bornagain Christians begin their relationship with God by treating him as if he were really
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there, even though not quite believing it. Luhrmann tells of a pastor encouraging his
born-again congregation to “experience God as a friend” (74) through acts like pouring
God a cup of coffee in the morning and providing a chair in which God can sit. Such
behavior can reinforce the person’s belief that God is really present, listening, caring, and
active.
Whether through seemingly eccentric behavior such as affirming God’s presence
with props, or simply practicing “chatting easily, comfortably, and openly with God
about whatever [comes into their heads]” (75), the experience of God as a present
personality must be nurtured. Christians who enact their beliefs and experience God in
this way are not (usually) mentally imbalanced, therefore their encounters with God are
“in a different epistemological category than an encounter with an actual human or, for
that matter, than whatever the Bible [says] about God” (80). In other words, it is not that
born-again Christians believe God is a person, but they experience him, in some ways,
like a person.25 Luhrmann writes that those in her study “set out, at the church’s
invitation, to treat God like an imaginary friend. When [she] asked people whether they
experienced God as an imaginary friend, they usually rejected the word imaginary – and
then accepted the comparison” (77).
Interactions with God, in many ways, resemble everyday human-to-human
interactions. While God’s characteristics are obviously fantastic, for reasons we will
discuss later in further detail,26 the conceptual content and emotional trajectories of
interactions with God are quite mundane. A believer’s relationship with this God

25

This is not surprising, considering that “religious agents’ counterintuitive properties notwithstanding….
They exemplify all of the standard sorts of interests, motivations, and states of mind that we recognize and
acknowledge in our fellow human beings” (McCauley 185).
26
Chapter V.
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resembles a human relationship to the extent that it can provide great comfort in times of
distress or threat. The relationship is different, however, in that belief in God’s
supernature allows for the perception of unconditional and universal love and purpose for
the believer. This aspect of perceived omnibenevolence allows for insight into some
people’s post-deconversion longing to believe.
So, regardless of one’s verdict on the ontological question of the existence of
God, born-again Christians’ relationships with God should not be doubted. God, whether
he exists or not, is a concept and an intentional object to which believers actually relate,
and these relationships are often very emotionally powerful. Evidence for God’s
independent existence may be spurious, but that does not allow us to discount the reality
of meaningful relationships with God. As philosopher Wayne Proudfoot puts it, “A
person might be afraid of a ghost. His fear and the ghost are conceptually related in that
reference to the ghost is necessary in order to identify his fear. This holds even though
there are no ghosts and his fear is unfounded” (101). The person’s fear, induced by the
idea of the ghost, is no less real because the concept “ghost” is not the most accurate
possible conceptual representation of her objective physical environment. The same is
true for experiences of God’s love and care. The experienced love or friendship of God
cannot be discounted only because the God believed in is not ontologically
independent.27 Aside from the philosophical justification for seeing relationships with
God as real relationships, empirical findings in psychology provide additional support.

27

For further discussion, see Dennett, Breaking The Spell 210-215.
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God, The Attachment Figure

Originally made famous by developmental psychologist John Bowlby
(Attachment and Loss), “attachment theory” proposes that humans have an in-born
“psychobiological system (the attachment behavioral system) that motivates them to seek
proximity to significant others (attachment figures) in times of need as a way of
protecting themselves from threats and alleviating distress” (Grandqvist, Mikulincer, &
Shaver 49). Attachment figures not only function as a safe haven by providing protection
from threats, but also act as a secure base from which to explore the uncertain aspects of
one’s environment. This social psychological model was initially suggested with the
intent of understanding the relationship between human infants and their parents
(primarily their mothers.) The motivation for proximity produced by the attachment
system is thought to be evolutionarily adaptive in that it increases the likelihood that the
infant will be protected from harm. The nature of the infant’s relationship to the
mother/guardian (or attachment figure, more broadly) is identified along a spectrum of
three attachment styles, depending on the infant’s response to the guardian’s presence
and absence, respectively. The attachment styles can be summarized as follows:
Secure: “…characterized by confidence in a caregiver’s capacity and
willingness to provide protection and comfort. It is also characterized by
an ability to distinguish between situations in which protection is needed
and ones in which it is not and an ability to flexibly shift attention and
behavioral engagement between attachment and nonattachment
activities…. In contrast, attachment insecurities are characterized by
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difficulties in distinguishing safe from unsafe situations and by the use of
mental resources to deal with anxiety caused by unreliable or unavailable
caregivers.” (Grandqvist, Mikulincer, & Shaver 50)
Insecure - Anxious/Ambivalent: characterized by a tendency to
overenthusiastically seek proximity to attachment figures.
Insecure - Avoidant: characterized by a tendency to “defensively minimize
proximity seeking to protective others.” (50)
Expanding on the theory’s initial utility in developmental psychology, it was soon
suggested that the attachment system continues to be “active and influential throughout
the [person’s] lifespan” (Kirkpatrick & Shaver 316). The attachment model has since
been successfully used to interpret behavior and attitudes toward various intimate
relationships throughout adolescence and adulthood. The theory has been particularly
useful in understanding the psychological components of adult romantic relationships
(Granqvist, Mikulincer, Gewirtz, & Shaver 2). Considering the explanatory power and
plasticity of the attachment model, it is no surprise that it has also been used to illuminate
psychology of religion.
Reinforcing the evidence previously discussed, that born-again Christians tend to
experience God as present regardless of his objective existence/non-existence,
psychologist Lee Kirkpatrick was the first of many to explore the idea that a religious
believer’s perceived relationship with God could be understood in terms of attachment
theory (“Attachment-Theory Approach to the Psychology of Religion”). Since
Kirkpatrick’s initial suggestion, much experimental work has been done exploring the
extent to which “believers’ perceived relationships with God tend to meet the defining
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criteria for attachment relationships and hence function psychologically much like other
attachments” (Grandqvist, Mikulincer, Gewirtz, & Shaver 51). God relationships have
shown, in many experimental settings, to adhere predictably to attachment model
explanations (i.e., to function similarly to other real relationships).
For example, evidence from a 2004 study suggested that one’s God concept has
the capacity to function as a safe haven, to which individuals may seek to draw near in
response to threats. In this study, participants’ anthropomorphic theological convictions
were assessed by having them “indicate on a six-step response scale (1=strongly disagree,
6=strongly agree) the extent to which they agreed with the single statement, ‘God is a
living, personal being who is interested and involved in human lives and affairs’”
(Birgegard & Grandqvist 1125). Participants were then exposed to subliminal messages
that were flashed through a lens too quickly to be consciously registered, either “mother
is gone,” “God has abandoned me,” or a control (“people are walking”). Those primed
with statements that posed “threat of separation” scored higher on post-priming measures
of seeking proximity to God (1133). The upshot of this particular study is that “God
validly can be seen as an attachment figure and that the attachment relationship with God
is influenced by [the individual’s] attachment history” (Birgegard & Grandqvist 1132).
Reinforcing the idea that God functions as a safe haven, “there is considerable
evidence to support the view that people turn to religion particularly in times of distress
and crisis, and it is important to note that they turn at such times to prayer… rather than
to church” (Kirkpatrick, “Attachment and Religious Representations” 807). This suggests
that believers turn to God, rather than exclusively to religious peers in times of distress.
Experimental findings have also shown that individual differences in believers’
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relationships with God predictably manifest along the aforementioned spectrum of
attachment styles (i.e., secure, anxious/ambivalent, avoidant).28 Given the predictive
power of interpreting God belief in an attachment framework, it seems safe to say that for
some believers the God-relationship functions as a real attachment relationship
(Grandqvist, Mikulincer, Gewirtz, & Shaver 13).
The understanding of God functioning as an attachment figure, more broadly of
God-relationships functioning as psychologically real, fits comfortably alongside related
evidence from many different disciplines. As discussed above, anthropological research
suggests that American Christians often relate to God as if he were a present personality
(Luhrmann, When God Talks Back). Philosophically, God is an intentional object that can
play an explanatory role in one’s theory of the world and of one’s emotional experiences,
regardless of the question of God’s independent existence (Dennett, Breaking the Spell;
Proudfoot). From a sociological perspective, belief in God is highest in countries “where
food and shelter are scarce and life is generally less secure” (Zuckerman, “Atheism:
Contemporary Numbers and Figures” 55). This sociological pattern holds true even
within the U.S., from state to state (Zuckerman, “Atheism, Secularity, and Well-being”
955). Belief in God tends to be the highest in states where social ills (e.g., murder rates,
poverty, obesity, infant mortality, teen pregnancy) are most prominent (955, 960).
These sociological findings corroborate the psychological literature, which
suggests that God has the potential to serve as a compensatory attachment figure when
others are unavailable or inadequate (Kirkpatrick, “Attachment and Religious
28

The believer’s style of attachment to God is thought to have some relation to her attachment style
regarding her parent/guardian. However, there is no clear consensus on whether God relationships simply
mirror parental attachment (“correspondence” hypothesis) or counteract the effect of distant or inadequate
parental attachment relationships (“compensation” hypothesis) or both. For a full discussion of both
hypotheses, see Grandqvist, Mikulincer, and Shaver 53-56.

45

Representations” 812). God, in the case of ill-functioning societies, may provide “a sense
of felt security and a secure base for exploration [or navigation] of the environment”
(807), which is not otherwise available given uncertain social conditions.29 So,
considering that there is sufficient evidence for concluding that born-again Christians
have real relationships with God from a psychological and phenomenological
perspective, a question presents itself. Does God’s absence after deconversion have
effects similar to death, psychologically and phenomenologically?

Death and Deconversion: Some Differences Acknowledged
Before laying out the case that God’s absence after deconversion and the absence
of a person after death both have similar consequences for cognition and experience, it is
important that I counter possible misunderstandings and/or preemptively undercut
possible objections to my position. Spelling out exactly what I do not intend to say will
serve the double function of both preempting counterarguments and spelling out more
clearly exactly what I do mean.
First, it should be obvious that I am not claiming that deconversion, like death, is
inevitable. It is obvious that many believers live long lives and believe in God throughout
their entire lifespan. Deconversion will only result from certain sets of particular
psychological, social and cultural circumstances that are sufficient to produce not only
adherence to born-again Christianity initially, but later, disbelief in the God of born-again
Christianity (and in my use of the term “deconversion,” disbelief in gods and the
supernatural more generally).
29

This suggestion of a causal account is purely hypothetical, as only a correlational relationship between
social ills and religiosity is shown. However, exploration into the nature of the correlation between the two
would be an exciting and potentially socially helpful area of research.
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Second, I am not suggesting that because some deconversions may have
emotional and conceptual similarities to death, they therefore necessarily have the same
emotional intensity. The intensity of the deconversion experience will depend largely on
the perceived importance of the individual’s relationship with God (i.e., the proximity of
the God concept to the center of the individual’s “web of belief,” to revisit a metaphor.)
My intuition is that the majority of deconversions will be less emotionally intense than
the experience of the death of someone, due to the fact that the God of born-again
Christianity is not experienced as a person (e.g., he is not seen, touched, or heard at
length, literally), but he is experienced much like a person30 (e.g., his presence is
emotionally felt, the perception of communication occurs, and he is occasionally literally
heard) (Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 233-234). However, whether deconversion is,
on average, more or less emotionally intense than death for those who deconvert is an
open empirical question.
Third, death and deconversion are not likely to have similar sequential emotional
stages; rather they are both potentially emotionally significant and share key conceptual
shifts. While this may seem at first to present a problem for the proposed analogy, it is
not a problem in that neither deconversion nor death is likely to have a set of standard
sequential emotional stages. There are myriad examples of deconverts recounting their
experience using very different emotional language, some describing deconversion as
“liberation” (Zuckerman, Faith No More 32) and some saying they “barely functioned”
(The Chaplain) for some time afterward. As for the experience of death, recent research

30

“The main point is that the mental muscles developed in prayer work on the boundary between thought
and perception, between what is attributed to the [believer’s] mind… and what exists in the world. They
focus attention on the words and images on one side of the boundary, and they treat those words and
images as if they belonged on the other” (Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 184).
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on grief has undermined the soundness of Elizabeth Kübler-Ross’s famous five-stage
model of grief.31 Kübler-Ross, in her book On Death and Dying, hypothesized that those
facing either their own death or the death of another will experience five emotional stages
during the grieving process. Denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance
comprise the five emotional stages of the Kübler-Ross model, which has recently been
criticized.
For instance, in psychology journalist Ruth Davis Konigsberg’s 2011 book The
Truth About Grief: The Myth of its Five Stages and the New Science of Loss, she writes,
“We have been misled by the concept that grief is a series of steps that ultimately deposit
us at a psychological finish line, even while social science increasingly indicates that it’s
more a grab bag of symptoms that come and go and, eventually, simply lift” (11).
Konigsberg points out that the Kübler-Ross model tends toward self-fulfilling prophecy
and is prone to confirmation bias (72). It is, then, the model’s popular frequency that
provides the appearance of legitimacy, rather than its scientific utility or predictive
efficacy. The lack of stages for either the experience of death or deconversion allows the
analogy to proceed unhindered. The two can be thought of as conceptually similar and
emotionally impactful for a time after their occurrence.
Finally, the fact that I am suggesting that death and deconversion have the
potential to be similar experiences should not be understood as a suggestion that all
deconversion experiences are emotionally negative, should be avoided or discouraged, or
cause grief. In many cases, deconversion is sure to bring emotional relief or even “joy”
(Zuckerman, Faith No More 32). It is obvious that “there can be no single, grand,
universal explanation or theory of [deconversion]” (Zuckerman, Faith No More 172).
31

For an in-depth discussion, see Konigsberg 70-82.
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Even focusing on deconversion within born-again Christianity in the U.S., exceptions
will occur. That being said, however, some deconversions are emotionally negative and
do cause grief. These instances are usually not publicly highlighted because the atheist
movement (for obvious public relations reasons) wishes to portray deconversion in a
totally positive emotional light. On the other hand, Christian church leaders usually don’t
discuss deconversion experiences in detail at all.32 Also, even emotionally liberating or
positive deconversion experiences may be thought of as analogous to death, as will be
explored below.

Atheism: The Death of the Personal God
Thus, we come to the hinge of this work: ways in which the experience of
deconversion is similar to the experience of death. Practitioners experience the God of
born-again Christianity as a present personality, as we have seen. It is the transition from
the experienced presence of God before deconversion to the subsequently experienced
absence that most lends itself to the analogy of death. Anecdotal evidence of this
characterization of deconversion can be seen in that numerous works utilize the phrase
“death of God” (Altizer; Young; Vattimo & Caputo), but none speak of the “malfunction
of God” or the “breaking down of God.” This is because God usually is conceived to
some extent as an intentional and active agent, and therefore "dies" rather than meeting a
less anthropomorphic end.
The underlying thread of my argument is that one’s beliefs about the world, to a
large extent, can shape one’s experience of the world. This truth applies to many (most?)
32

Or if they do, as mentioned before, they usually assume a volantaristic position regarding the deconvert’s
shift in belief.
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areas of human life, but in regard to the topic in question, “God” is a concept that plays a
pivotal role in many born-again Christians’ understanding of their physical and social
environments, as well as their own internal emotional patterns and responses (McCauley
85). God is, then, an intentional object33 that can play a functionally explanatory and
emotionally real role in believers’ lives. Philosopher Daniel Dennett discusses the impact
that intentional objects can have on individuals’ mental lives. Using the example of
Sherlock Holmes, Dennett writes:
It is quite possible for a mere intentional object like Sherlock Holmes to
obsess people even when they know full well that it isn’t real. So it is not
surprising that such a thing (if it’s right, in the end, to call it a kind of
thing at all) can dominate people’s lives when they believe it in the strong
sense, such as the people who spend fortunes hunting for the Loch Ness
Monster or Bigfoot. (Dennett, Breaking The Spell 213)
The irreverence of comparing the Loch Ness Monster and Bigfoot to the God of bornagain Christianity notwithstanding, the thrust of the argument remains. Bigfoot and the
Loch Ness Monster are clear-cut cases in which the intentional objects in question are
considered by (almost) all to be fictional. Yet, the belief in these intentional objects has a
real and observable impact on the believer. In terms of this work, God need not exist as
anything other than an intentional object in order for believers to have psychologically
and experientially real relationships with him.
We have touched on the fact before, but it is worth revisiting in greater depth, that
the experience of deconversion is usually involuntary. Deconversion shares this aspect
with the experience of the death of another. Aside from the obvious exception of murder,
33

For a discussion of intentional objects, see Dennett, Breaking the Spell 210-217.
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the death of a family member, spouse, or friend is not the outcome of one’s will or mental
intention. Rather, one awakens on an unhappy morning to find that a person one has
known is no longer present and active in the world. Whether or not the death is
anticipated, the death event itself is a drastic change in one’s experience of the world.
This aspect of discovery as opposed to choice is present in the experience of
deconversion as well. As philosopher Wayne Proudfoot puts it, “Instances of sudden
conversion to or from a religious tradition are few compared to cases in which a person
comes to discover, on the basis of his observations of his behavior and spontaneous
responses over a period of time, that he has lost his faith…” (Proudfoot, Religious
Experience 111).
Unfortunately, the involuntary nature of worldview adoption is not recognized in
much of the literature that utilizes attachment theory in understanding God relationships.
For example, psychologist Lee Kirkpatrick writes:
The threat of separation causes anxiety in the attached person, and loss of
the attachment figure causes grief. Determining whether God meets these
criteria is a difficult matter, because one does not become separated from,
or lose a relationship with, God as one might lose a human relationship
partner. God does not die, sail off to fight wars, move away, or file for
divorce…. The most obvious approximation to separation from or loss of
God is deconversion or apostacy…. It is not clear whether “losing” a
relationship with God in this way can be expected to engender grief,
however, as it is the believer rather than God who is deliberately choosing
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to abandon the relationship. (Kirkpatrick, “Attachments and Religious
Representations” 808, emphasis mine)
This unfortunate misunderstanding of the deconversion process leaves Kirkpatrick
overlooking the fact that God (or at least the believer’s relationship with God) often goes
away without the deconvert choosing to abandon her belief. It is reasonable to assume,
then, that grief is a likely consequence of such a shift in belief. In religious societies such
as the U.S., belief in God is highly valued and this creates an incentive for retaining one’s
belief even in the face of growing doubt. Some born-again Christians may choose to
leave their religious community and self-identify as atheists, but this voluntary change is
only in regard to one’s social environment and public self-identification, not to one’s
theory of the world.34
The view of deconversion as a gradual and involuntary change, stated above by
Proudfoot, is further legitimated by Altemeyer & Hunsberger’s study of those who
deconverted after having been raised religious. They found that the deconversion process
began, on average, at the age of 16.2 and took an average of three years within their
sample (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, Amazing Conversions 210-211). The authors write,
“[The deconverts’] edifice of religious beliefs then began to come apart, brick by brick,
until finally the whole design came crashing down. This took a fair bit of time precisely
because it took place step by step” (211). For this reason, it seems safe to say that
deconversion probably phenomenologically resembles deaths brought on by illness more
so than deaths brought on by sudden causes. God does not die in a car crash, if you will.35

34

Such social changes, most likely, will follow in the wake of a change in one’s theory of the world. In
other words, when one realize she doesn’t believe in God, then she might leave her church and call herself
an “atheist.”
35
The gradual change of deconverts’ concepts of God will be addressed further in Chapter V.
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Grieving the Loss of God
The most obvious aspect of experiencing the death of another person (especially a
loved one) is that of grief. Deconversion, despite the misunderstandings articulated in
some attachment theory literature, clearly has the potential to engender grief in the
deconverting individual. A portion of this power, no doubt, comes from the fact that
born-again Christianity claims that a relationship with God is a necessary part of human
fulfillment and happiness, and believers (i.e., potential deconverts) agree. Like the very
fact of God’s existence, the claim that a relationship with God is necessary for a good life
need not be true to be experienced as true. After deconverting, then, people may not only
believe that they have lost a relationship with God, but that this relationship was the only
chance of a fulfilling and joyous life. It is not surprising that such a belief would often
result in grief.
Examples of grief as a part of the deconversion process can be seen in various
qualitative studies on atheism, apostasy, and deconversion. In Phil Zuckerman’s study on
Americans who have rejected religion, one interviewee is quoted at length discussing the
sense of loss that he experienced through his own deconversion:
The absolute best thing about being religious – or I should say, being an
Evangelical Christian – was the deep personal relationship that I thought I
had with God. I mean, it’s a powerful thing to imagine that the God of the
universe is on your side, talking to you on a daily basis, and that you’re
actually communicating with that God. That’s powerful. And I think that
gave me some confidence, and it gave me a sense of – that my future was
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really sealed and that God had good things waiting for me – a sense of
optimism. (Zuckerman, Faith No More 129-130)
This man describes the relationship with God as being “the best thing” about being a
born-again Christian. The loss of this important relationship has the potential to cause
emotional difficulty for deconverting individuals.
One person in Hunsberger and Altemeyer’s book Atheists: A Groundbreaking
Study of America’s Nonbelievers reports that his atheism has “cost him a lot,” and that
subsequently he “nearly commited suicide” (51). Others who have experienced difficult
emotions of loss after deconversion speak of losing the sense of “always [having]
somewhere to turn” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 52). The ability of deconversion to
engender grief goes hand in hand with the involuntaristic view of belief. In many cases, if
the individual had the ability to choose their worldview, they would choose to believe.
This is true at least for some individuals in the beginning of the deconversion process,
which can be especially emotionally difficult. One individual writes of his attempts to
hold on to the faith that was so important to him:
I had been a sincere, dedicated Christian, seriously trying to live a
Christian life and understand Christian doctrine. And as a result of doing
just what I had been told to do – study and learn Christianity – I had
discovered a spiderweb of cracks in the very foundation! In short, my
gradual loss of faith was not something I did willfully or maliciously.
Indeed, I fought. I kicked and raged over each millimeter. It was like
losing my heart. (Nahigian)
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Those deconverts who speak of the emotional hardship of losing God, often use
language that seems to corroborate the view that God can serve as an attachment figure
for the believer. One of Zuckerman’s deconverted interviewees utilizes such attachment
language, tying his relationship with God to his understanding of how safe he feels the
world to be:
It was a little bit saddening for me because I had used it as like a way to
feel more secure in life, and felt like I had a purpose and a direction.
Losing that made me really feel, like, lost… And… I still don’t necessarily
have a clear sense of purpose for my life. Which is something that I miss.
Because it just feels so much more secure, like: ‘I KNOW why I’m here…
I KNOW my goals.’ Like, I don’t really have that anymore. But… it’s not
as bad as it was at first… I’ve moved on a bit. (Zuckerman, Faith No
More 130)
In this quotation, the interviewee uses language that mirrors that of the attachment theory
model almost verbatim. As a believer, he felt much more “secure.” He also employs
language that resembles Konigsberg’s understanding of the grief process, in that the
experience of deconverting was emotionally difficult for the interviewee at first, but the
feeling “eventually, simply [lifted]” (Konigsberg 11).
Deconversion that engenders grief may also be especially emotionally difficult
when compared to other emotionally difficult situations. Recent evidence suggests that
secure attachment to God is a reliable predictor for lower grief in situations of loss
(Kelley and Chan 211). The tendency to use God as an attachment figure may increase
any emotional difficulty during deconversion if the individual has a “heightened
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psychological access to their perceived relationship with God as a safe haven when
threatened or distressed, just as people do with human attachment figures” (Granqvist,
Mikulincer, Gewirtz, and Shaver 1).36 However, in cases of deconversion, the ability of
God (who is now believed to be absent) to provide comfort seems unlikely, although to
my knowledge no empirical work has been done regarding the question of God’s role as
attachment figure during deconversion experiences.
So, deconversion and death are similar in that they have the potential to engender
grief. However, as mentioned before, even in cases when the deconvert experiences relief
or liberation at the loss of God, the analogy with death may still hold. And it is clear that
the reactions to deconversion run the emotional gamut from depression and grief to
liberation and joy.

Ambivalence or Liberation Toward the Loss of God
The above discussion of the God relationship as an attachment relationship allows
us to understand that believers’ relationships with God are as diverse as relationships
with human attachment figures. Not every believer approaches God by way of a secure
attachment style. Some conceptions of God are less than pleasant, as can be seen in more
fundamentalist strands of born-again Christianity, where God is portrayed often as an
authoritarian leader. Such a conception of God is unsurprising considering that religions
frequently, to one degree or another, “promote authoritarian following, teaching their

36

There is empirical evidence for automatic access to God concepts “following mild and severe distress
primes,” and the speed at which God concepts are accessed appears to be related to the believer’s
“interpersonal attachment orientation” (Granqvist, Mikulincer, Gewirtz, and Shaver 7). The nature of this
relationship is contested.
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members to submit to religious and even civic authority” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger
236).
Since believers ultimately have a relationship with their conception of God,
defined largely by their personal experiences and social context, less loving versions of
the concept of God may result in insecure attachment relationships. Conceptions of God
as an inadequate attachment figure may be reinforced by the individuals’ particular
attachment style in other relationships. As Lee Kirkpatrick writes, “Individual differences
in religious beliefs and experience should parallel individual differences in attachment
styles and mental models” (“Attachment and Religious Representations” 809).37 Reports
by individuals who have deconverted support the existence of insecure attachment
relationships to God. One deconverted individual writes:
I put a lot of energy into talking to God and listening for His voice when I
first came to Him in high school. In fact, I sought Him with all my heart –
every fiber of my being! I've never tried so hard for so long at anything in
my life. I pleaded on my knees before Him day and night. I fasted. I
prayed. I meditated. I changed everything about myself. I focused on
nothing other than hearing His voice and doing His will for more than two
years. I can honestly say that I could not have tried any harder than I did.
And what did I hear? The voice of one who disdained my every effort to
serve Him. Nothing that I did was ever enough. I was a perpetual failure in
the eyes of... whatever it was that answered me. If He said He loved me, it
was only in the context of “I love you so much... aren't you grateful for
37

For further discussion of the “correspondence hypothesis,” see Kirkpatrick, “Attachment and Religious
Representations” 808-812.
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that love? Why are you ashamed to witness about My love to the other
kids at school?” If it was God, then He hated me. (Avellone)
This former believer obviously did not experience the purpose or security felt by those
who grieved the loss of God. While God provides a secure base and safe haven for some,
others experience God as “controlling” (Zuckerman, Faith No More 134), “unjust” (54),
untrustworthy (Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 122), or perpetually disapproving
(Avellone).
When God relationships such as these come to an end, the experience is usually
described as emotionally positive. Deconverts who have experienced the loss of an
untrustworthy, judging, and authoritarian God explain their shift away from religious
belief in optimistic language. One deconvert is quoted as saying, “I feel very liberated….
Now I am free from the fear of religion and the clutches… I don’t have anybody
controlling what I have to think, what I have to read, what I have to say, who to marry,
how to make love” (Zuckerman, Faith No More 134).
It is important to realize, however, that just because deconversions from more
authoritarian versions of God can engender positive emotional states, rather than grief,
they still entail a loss. “Loss” here should not be thought of as a normative designation,
but rather as a descriptive term. The concept of God that is lost may be an unhealthy and
even dangerous concept, but the God in question is perceived as going away. Emotionally
positive deconversion experiences still involve a shift from a perception of the actuality
and causal efficacy of a personality to that of said personality’s absence. Such
deconversions may be said to mirror the death of a person whose influence on one’s life
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was particularly harmful or destructive. Thus, when the person dies one may feel a sense
of relief, freedom or liberation.

Deconversion, Selfhood, and Social Context
Though the primary focus of this work is the individual’s psychological
deconversion experience in light of the loss of the God relationship, a brief discussion of
the social aspects of deconversion, as well as the place of deconversion in regard to selfunderstanding will help to situate and enrich the view of the deconversion process.
Deconversions from theism do not happen in a vacuum. Rather, they take place in various
social contexts. The social features of this experience are especially relevant considering
both the social nature of the occurrence itself (i.e., loss of the relationship with God) and
the fact that Christian beliefs are usually entrenched in religious communities, such as
churches or Bible studies. Those speaking for the atheist movement often acknowledge
the possible difficulty of leaving Christian communities after deconversion. However, for
this social rupture to be understood fully, it must be considered in the light of the
(potentially emotionally difficult) conceptual shift that is undergone by the deconvert,
which is the concentration of this work.
For example, the social aspects of one’s self-concept are formed, in part, by one’s
theological beliefs. One’s self-concept is constructed out of various pieces of information
about one’s preferences, personality traits, behavioral tendencies, social roles,
propositional beliefs and more (Baumeister and Finkel 145). Belief in God influences
one’s self-concept by affecting the social roles and labels with which one identifies (e.g.,
church member, believer, Christian, child of God.) When one experiences deconversion,
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then, not only do one’s beliefs about and experience of the world change, ideas about the
self must be adjusted as well.38
Philosopher Alva Noë points out the indeterminacy and problematic nature of the
attempts to draw a definitive boundary between what humans believe about the contents
of their world and their experience of selfhood, writing, “radical changes to one’s
environment… for example, in the course of migrating from one country to another, upon
the loss of a spouse, during a period of rapid technological change – are enormous,
maybe even devastating personal challenges. The loss of a feature of the environment
with which one’s daily activities are intimately interwoven is the loss of a part of oneself”
(Noë 51). If one is a true believer, then, deconversion poses the challenge of
renegotiating one’s self-concept: a notoriously challenging undertaking.39
So, deconversion could be said to imply two conceptual shifts in light of the fact
that God-relationships may function as attachment relationships. “If God functions as an
attachment figure for believers, then they should hold mental representations of (1) God
and (2) themselves in relation to God” (Miner 252). This change of the deconvert’s
concept of self as a possible source of difficulty in the deconversion process must be
acknowledged, although comprehensive consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of
this work. The possible analogy of deconversion as the “death of the believing self”
would be an interesting area for potential future research.
38

This reconceptualization of the self potentially involves adjustment of many levels of one’s self-concept:
from social labels (e.g., “Christian,” “Theist”) to one’s more fundamental idea of one’s personhood (e.g.,
recognition that humans are animals). This latter shift is due to the fact that “which views about human
nature are held is inextricably tied up with views about the nature of God – his mind, his will, his agency,
his nature” (Flanagan 2002, 52-53).
39
There is some empirical evidence that the self-concept changes throughout the process of bereavement,
specifically that “the self-concept appears to undergo structural change over the first two years of
bereavement” (Montpetit, Bergeman, and Bisconti 620). Given this evidence, investigation into the
potential similarities between self-concept change in regard to bereavement and in regard to deconversion
would be an interesting area of research.
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Also, in terms of the social context of deconversion, the role and reaction of one’s
community in the aftermath of the event of death is likely very different from the reaction
of one’s community in the aftermath of deconversion. As I mentioned earlier, social
distrust of atheists measures higher than distrust of most other social minorities (Gervais,
Shariff, and Norenzayan). Therefore, at least in cases of publicly acknowledged
deconversion, the individual is not simply experiencing the loss of the God relationship,
but also potential rejection by a social group with which they have heretofore identified.
This is, in part, because the interactions of Christian community members
reinforce the affirmation of the objective reality of God for individuals within the
community. The social bolstering of God belief can be seen in both ecclesial settings and
more informal situations. For example, members of the Vineyard church “would check
with each other to see whether they had ‘gotten’ similar images in prayer. They asked
people to pray for them, and sometimes followed up to see what those prayers had
revealed” (Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 65). Communal discourse and negotiation
can serve to determine what God is thought to have said or done in a particular
community.
The fact that the God concept functions on a social level (Luhrmann, When God
Talks Back 93, 279, 283), as well as an individual level, undoubtedly makes the
deconversion experience more difficult than it otherwise would be for some who undergo
such a transition. While deaths often serve to bring communities together in mutual
support around those who have lost a loved one, deconversions often cause negative
reactions toward the individual who has lost belief in God (Zuckerman 2012, 71).
Therefore, the parallels between deconversion and the loss of a relationship due to death
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may hold on the individual level (e.g., both are emotionally significant and potentially
negative), while at the social level the two function quite differently.40 The social
rejection that many deconverts face, no doubt exacerbates any emotional difficulty they
may be experiencing individually due to the loss of the God relationship. In short, when a
friend dies, one’s community assembles to provide comfort and encouragement. When
one’s God dies, however, one’s community may offer little to no support or
understanding, and may even blame the individual who is experiencing the difficult
personal shift (Hunsberger and Altemeyer 50-53).41
Recent examples of socially difficult deconversions have put human faces on this
increasingly prevalent trend of migration of former believers away from religious
communities. The cases gaining the most media attention are those that involve clergy
members who have lost their faith. Former Methodist pastor and current Public Relations
Director for the American Atheists, Teresa MacBain, deconverted over a long period of
time. During her deconversion experience, MacBain was still working as a pastor at a
Methodist church in Florida and was concerned about the ramifications of her change in
belief, both in regard to her social standing and view of herself. MacBain recounts the
personal importance of her former faith, “When you believe something so strongly, when
you’ve been immersed in your faith your entire life, when it is just as much a part of you
as your arms, or legs, or fingers, then the acknowledgement of change is a very hard pill
to swallow. I didn’t want to lose my faith. I didn’t want to change or stop believing, but I
wanted truth more!” (Mehta, “Teresa MacBain”). She was reluctant to inform her
40

Altemeyer and Hunsberger report that most of those in their study who deconverted “felt guilty or fearful
about doubting the family religion” and that “they had often paid a heavy price for their apostasy:
alienation from their families and loss of friends” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 213, 215).
41
Blaming those who deconvert or holding them responsible for their shift in belief, again, reveals a
volantaristic understanding of how people acquire beliefs.
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congregation of her loss of faith, although she was uncomfortable with her inevitable
dishonesty when preaching.
MacBain’s apprehension about acknowledging her shift to atheism publicly was
not unreasonable. In early 2012, MacBain announced her atheism publicly for the first
time when she was unexpectedly given the opportunity to speak while attending an
atheist convention. Immediately following the convention, she intended to officially
resign from her pastoral position and explain her change in belief to her congregation.
However, the video of MacBain’s speech at the atheist convention went viral before she
had the chance.42 Her description of the aftermath of her public pronouncement of
atheism warrants quoting at length:
The fallout was immediate and devastating. The church, where I had
pastored for over three years, changed all the locks and would not let me
on the property to collect my belongings. It took over two months to get
them to return my things. The local news ran my story for three weeks,
garnering thousands of online comments. I received hateful emails,
voicemails, letters, and facebook posts and messages. My son’s friends
would not have anything to do with him because I was his mother, and
many of my husband’s co-workers came to him offering their ‘sympathy.’
One even asked him when we were getting a divorce! (Mehta)
For Teresa MacBain, then, the social consequences of publicly acknowledging her
deconversion were significant and largely negative (at least from her former Christian
community.) MacBain’s deconversion does not appear to have resembled the experience
of death, as the majority of her difficulty came from the social and economic shifts that
42

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgDm8w0-IwY
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resulted from the alteration of her belief.43 But these social and economic difficulties may
still be part of the equation for those believers whose deconversions do resemble the
experience of death, which is likely to exacerbate the potential for emotional hardship.
The deconversion story of former pastor Jerry DeWitt also gained media attention
in early 2012. DeWitt lived as a travelling Christian evangelist and speaker based out of
DeRidder, Louisiana before his deconversion. As a result of his “coming out” as an
atheist, DeWitt “lost his job and his wife — both, he says, as a direct consequence”
(Worth). DeWitt has also experienced alienation from family members and former
friends. He is now the head of Recovering from Religion, an organization assisting those
former-believers who have deconverted. As with MacBain’s situation, the social
aftermath of the personal deconversion experience was incredibly difficult for DeWitt.
In situations like those of MacBain and DeWitt, we can see that deconversion and
death are very different at the social level regardless of their similarities in regard to the
deconverting individual. The aftermath of public acknowledgement of deconversion is
likely to entail a more reproachful social environment than the experience of death. The
atheist movement is in the beginning stages of addressing the need for community among
the deconverted in the U.S. For example, MacBain and DeWitt both made their
respective moves away from Christianity with the aid of The Clergy Project, a
“confidential online community for active and former clergy who do not hold
supernatural beliefs” (The Clergy Project).
The need for community, as evidenced by the focus of this work, is not the only
hardship that deconversion poses to the individual experiencing it. The personal
43

When MacBain was asked if she missed God, she replied “No, no… I can’t say that I do” (Hagerty,
“From Minister to Atheist”).
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readjustments that one must make in light of this change are often significant. “The
transition away from faith may start with an intellectual epiphany, but it runs through a
difficult reinterpretation of your own past. For believers, this often involves what DeWitt
calls a ‘hook,’ or a miraculous story that helps anchor your faith” (Worth). DeWitt’s idea
of a “hook,” an event or experience thought to be miraculous or sacred prior to
deconversion, points to the connection between one’s worldview and one’s experience of
the world. After deconversion, one’s conceptual model of the world must be reorganized
and therefore one experiences the world differently to some extent. Namely, one no
longer experiences God as an active and purposive presence. The miraculous, the sacred,
and God are no longer concepts that the deconvert can employ when attempting to
understand her environment, her experiences, or herself.
Now that I have explored the similarities between the experience of deconversion
and that of death, the question arises as to why these experiences should be similar at all.
What are the underlying psychological mechanisms that would allow people to
experience God as present and active in the first place? I will focus on two specifically,44
namely, theory of mind and the attribution of teleology, or purposiveness. These two
psychological mechanisms, I suggest, play fundamental roles in cultivating the
experience of the God relationship for many born-again Christian believers, and
therefore, they allow the experience of deconversion to mirror that of death in some
instances. I turn first to theory of mind.

44

I am not suggesting that these two psychological mechanisms are explanatorily exhaustive of the
functioning of the God relationship, however.
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Chapter V: Who’s There? – God and Theory of Mind
…were I perchance to look out my window and observe men crossing the square, I would
ordinarily say I see the men themselves…. But what do I see aside from hats and clothes,
which could conceal automata? Yet I judge them to be men. Thus what I thought I had
seen with my eyes, I actually grasped solely with the faculty of judgment,
which is my mind. – Rene Descartes
My muscles move at my will, and water flows through a river. Who's to say that the river
doesn't have a will to move the water? The river overflows its banks, and floods my
tribe's gathering-place - why not think that the river was angry, since it moved its parts to
hurt us? It's what we would think when someone's fist hit our nose. – Eliezer Yudkowsky
Don’t anthropomorphize computers. They hate it. – Unknown
In 1944, psychologists Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel conducted a series of
now-famous experiments exploring social perception. Heider and Simmel showed
participants a video, which featured two triangles of different sizes, a circle and a
rectangle. The two triangles and the circle move in various ways throughout the video,
sometimes entering and exiting the rectangle.45

Fig. 1. Screenshot from Heider and Simmel’s classic experiment (244).

45

The video is available for viewing online at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZBKer6PMtM
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When responding to the prompt “Write down what happened in the picture,” all but one
participant explained the video in anthropomorphic terms. That is, they explained the
motions of the geometric figures in terms of mental states, purposes, desires, and goals.
One participant described the scene as follows:
Triangle number-one shuts his door (or should we say line) and the two
innocent young things walk in. Lovers in the two-dimensional world, no
doubt; little triangle number-two and sweet circle. Triangle-one (here-after
known as the villain) spies the young love. Ah! ...He opens his door, walks
out to see our hero and his sweet. But our hero does not like the
interruption (we regret that our actual knowledge of what went on at this
particular moment is slightly hazy, I believe we didn't get the exact
conversation), he attacks triangle-one rather vigorously (maybe the big
bully said some bad word). (Heider and Simmel 247)
Even the authors themselves include a description of the video using anthropomorphic
terms because, they claim, “a description in purely geometrical terms would be too
complicated and too difficult to understand” (Heider and Simmel 245). Why would a
purely geometrical description, which is surely more accurate in regard to the actual
content of the video, be so difficult to understand?
The reason that anthropomorphic explanations of this video are so readily
comprehensible to most people, even though there are no people in the video, is because
most psychologically healthy human beings have what psychologists describe as the

67

capacity (and tendency) to form “theories of mind.” Theory of mind46 is the ability to
“reason about others’ actions in terms of mental states such as beliefs and desires”
(Barrett, Born Believers 33). The interpretation of the physical movement of animate
objects in terms of inferred mental states allows humans to more accurately predict the
actions of animate objects.47 This capacity is so basic and automatic for humans that we
are rarely explicitly conscious that we are attributing mental states to other humans
during regular social interactions.
I do most of my writing in various coffee shops and when purchasing coffee, I
never state my intentions outright in order to gain the initial attention of the server. I
never need to stand at the counter and declare, “I am standing here for a reason and it is
that I would like to buy some coffee!” The barista’s theory of mind in regard to me, leads
him or her to assume that, rather than arbitrarily or because of some purposeless external
force, I have approached the counter for some purpose of my own. The most reasonable
inference, given the social context, is that I’d like to purchase something. While the
specifics of my order must be transmitted linguistically, the fact that I am at the counter
in order to fulfill some desire or goal need never be explicitly stated. The barista infers
(correctly, by the way) my mental state, namely a desire to purchase something. This
capacity also operates in different degrees. For example, I infer that the barista believes I
am standing at the counter for a purpose. In this case, I am theorizing about the content of
the barista’s theorizing about me. It is due to this second-order theory of mind (i.e., my
inferring the barista’s beliefs about me) that I do not feel the need to explain that I am at

46

Theory of mind is also known as “folk psychology” or “intuitive psychology.”
“animate things are the ones that can start and stop and move on their own as well as move in variable
ways along irregular paths” (McCauley 77).
47
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the counter for a purpose. In other words, both the barista and I both use theory of mind
in order to appropriately navigate this simple social situation.
Humans’ theory of mind cognitions engage on a hair trigger, as is exemplified in
Heider and Simmel’s experiment. At the slightest provocation, humans attribute agency48
to perceptions of movement within their environment. In order to explain this
predisposition for attributing agency very liberally, psychologists have posited that
humans have “HADD – the hypersensitive agent detection device” (Barrett, Why Would
Anyone 32). The HADD describes humans’ cognitive tendency to over-attribute agency
to instances of movement. “HADD appears to register nonintertial, goal-directed
movement as caused by an agent and then searches for a candidate agent” (32). This
tendency is found even in human infants as young as twelve months (Barrett, Born
Believers 29). While a technical knowledge of the HADD may be an idea that is most
influential within social psychology and psychology of religion, the principle that people
over-attribute agency is implicitly understood and utilized in many artistic mediums. One
of the most notable areas in popular culture that exploits HADD and theory of mind is
horror movies.
For example, a cheaply made independent American horror movie was released in
1999, which found both critical and box office success (Rotten Tomatoes; Box Office
Mojo). The Blair Witch Project, although fictional, purports to be footage shot by three
amateur documentary filmmakers who went missing while investigating local folklore
about a witch in Maryland. The three filmmakers spend the majority of the movie lost in
the woods. During the daytime scenes they fight over which direction will lead them
48

The terms “agency” and “agent” can be thought of as including “people and any other beings we
understand as not merely reacting to their environment but intentionally acting on it” (Barrett, Born
Believers 24).
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home and at night they are subjected to frightening noises deep within the woods that
surround their campsites.
While the film has some truly unnerving moments, the witch (or whatever it is)
that is harassing the three young filmmakers never makes an on-camera appearance.
Rather, the sounds of sticks breaking, rustling, and noises that sound vaguely similar to
human voices serve as forceful suggestions that someone is following and harassing the
young documentarians. From The Blair Witch Project to movies about hauntings that
feature furniture inexplicably rearranging itself or characters being attacked by an unseen
force, the thrills and chills in many horror movies are brought to us thanks to HADD.
In light of our tendency to over-attribute agency, it is not hard to understand the
connection between HADD, theory of mind, and belief in God or gods. As Robert
McCauley puts it, “Most prominently, religions proliferate agents. Most popular religion
depends upon activating human beings’ theory of mind capacities and introducing
anywhere from one to hundreds of surplus agents who are ordinarily invisible at least, if
not downright impossible to detect by any means” (169). When events occur that are
bizarre, or at least defy simple explanation, the attribution of agency is a natural step in
attempting to explain said events. Again, this is why the horror movie gimmick works so
well. When presented with a noise originating off-camera or a movement that seems to
defy our intuitive expectations of physical motion, attribution of goal-oriented agency is a
cognitively comfortable approach when attempting an explanation. Less obvious is why
agents don’t need to “resemble humans” or even “be visible” (Barrett, Born Believers
26).
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Minimally Counterintuitive Agents

That humans often attribute agency in situations when no obvious agent is present
is a strange fact about human agency detection cognitions. It is for this reason that the
cognitive “device” that achieves these cognitions is described as “hypersensitive.”
Situations that make agentive explanations seem reasonable, but that deliver no obvious
candidates for agency are explicable in terms of humans’ ability to think about agents
who are not immediately perceptually present.49 The ability to think about absent or
unseen agents confers an obvious evolutionary advantage by helping people be prepared
to respond advantageously to both opportunities and threats. “The expense of false
positives (seeing agents where there are none) is minimal…. In contrast, the cost of not
detecting agents when they are actually around (either predator or prey) could be very
high” (Boyer 145). But why should ideas of permanently invisible or undetectable agents
be so widespread and even institutionalized in some cases?
The psychological anthropologist Pascal Boyer, in his seminal 2001 book
Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought, offers an
explanation for humans’ belief in agents with strange features such as invisibility,
omnipotence, the ability to break or adjust the physical law of cause and effect, and so
on. He claims that these concepts are memorable because they are “counterintuitive,”

49

“To function properly in social groups, survive the threat of predators, or capture prey, we (like our
ancestors) must be able to think about agents we cannot even see. Tracks, traces, noises, or even
inexplicable silence need to be useful as cues that an agent might be around, watching and waiting”
(Barrett, Born Believers 32).
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which is to say they violate our intuitive expectations about the ontological categories to
which they belong. Boyer writes:
To produce a good supernatural concept, you must describe something as
belonging to an ontological category. But there are not many different
ontological categories. Indeed, we have some reasons to think that
ANIMAL, PERSON, TOOL (including many man-made objects other
than tools proper), NATURAL OBJECT (e.g., rivers mountains) and
PLANT more or less exhaust the list. Once you have the ontological
category, you must add a violation. (Boyer 78)
Agents such as gods, devils, demons, ghosts, spirits, witches, and saints are
particularly memorable because they are “minimally counterintuitive” (Barrett, Why
Would Anyone 22), that is they only counter our intuitions in one or a few aspects.
Concepts that are overly counterintuitive50 are easily forgettable because they don’t allow
us to apply other intuitions about the ontological category to infer further information
about the concept in question.51 A minimally counterintuitive agent (e.g., a man whose
only counterintuitive characteristic is invisibility) violates our expectations enough to be
intriguing, but still allows us to make standard inferences based on the agent’s
ontological category (e.g., the invisible man still has desires, preferences, emotions, is
subject to the law of gravity, and will eventually die). So, humans’ theory of mind
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“For instance, a dog that was made in a factory, gives birth to chickens, can talk to people, is invisible,
can read minds, can walk through walls, and can never die” (Barrett, Why Would Anyone 23).
51
For a discussion of the operationalization of counterintuitiveness and explorations of the potential
cognitively “optimum” amount of counterintuitiveness, see Barrett, “Coding and Quantifying
Counterintuitiveness in Religious Concepts.”
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capacity,52 HADD, and the memorability of minimally counterintuitive agents (and
concepts more generally) all function together to provide the fertile ground of human
psychology from which belief in gods (and God) grows. However, the psychological
features that underlie God belief may be necessary,53 but they are not sufficient.

The Born-again Christian God and Theory of Mind

Despite being cognitively “natural” (McCauley), belief in supernatural agents
such as God must be reinforced individually and communally, especially in religious
landscapes like the United States, where skepticism always poses a threat. Tanya
Luhrmann claims that interacting with God, in the born-again Christian context, is a skill
that must be learned. She writes, “Whatever one makes of the ontological claim that the
person praying is a link [between God and the person being prayed for], prayer clearly is
a technique: a skilled practice that has to be learned. Like many skills, acquiring it seems
to have consequences” (Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 135).
The “skill” of prayer, then, takes explicit practice. Humans, as we have explored,
have tendencies to understand events by positing agents who possess mental states. The
fact that humans often interpret occurrences of different kinds (e.g., otherwise random
physical motion) in terms of goal-directed agents (including God) is supplemented by the
born-again Christian focus on communally professed doctrinal beliefs, religious social
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Boyer cautions against an oversimplified understanding of theory of mind, writing, “our internal
description of other people’s mental life is not the product of a single, general theory of persons but the
outcome of many different perceptions, simulations and inferences about different aspects of what they
experience. What seemed a unified domain of ‘intuitive psychology’ is in fact a collection of subdomains
with specialized systems” (105).
53
For instance, autism is thought to impair theory of mind judgments (Boyer 221-222; McCauley 252259). This impairment seems to be related to religious thought, reinforcing the role that intuitive
psychology plays in God belief (McCauley 262-263; Norenzayan, Gervais, and Trzesniewski).
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hierarchy, and explicit instruction on how to communicate with God. These supplements,
Luhrmann argues, actually serve to change these Christians’ theory of mind. She writes:
This new Christian theory of mind – we could call it a “participatory”
theory of mind – asks congregants to experience the mind-world barrier as
porous, in a specific, limited way. Humans are usually keenly aware of the
difference between mental events generated within the mind (we call them
thoughts) and those generated from an external source (which are usually
called perceptions)…. These evangelical Christians, then, not only have to
accept the basic idea that they can experience God directly; they must
develop the interpretive tools to do so in a way that they can authentically
experience what feels like inner thought as God-generated. (Luhrmann,
When God Talks Back 40-41)
If Luhrmann is right, certain religious practices (e.g., communal and individual
prayer) can shift or focus the operations of humans’ theory of mind (133). When
undergoing this particular shift, Christians continue to attribute most of their own internal
thoughts, mental images, and emotional states to their own agency, but they also learn to
attribute certain thoughts to a separate agency. They learn to experience some internal
thoughts, images, and emotions (as well as certain external events) as having originated
from God, rather than from themselves. They interpret their own mental life as being the
product of two agents (i.e., themselves and God), as opposed to only one agent.54

54

For an interesting and relevant discussion of the implications of anthropomorphic interpretations in
regard to the ontology of minds, see Dennett, “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It
Works.” Dennett’s focus on appropriate interpretation as criteria for the existence of minds is interesting in
light of novel interpretations, such as those presented in Luhrmann’s study of born-again Christians.
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With practice and the help of the cognitive tendencies bestowed on them by
human nature, born-again Christians can cultivate the psychologically real relationship
with God that we have been exploring from various angles. While this relationship may
begin with the believer “pretending” that God is present and active in her life (71-75), it
does not continue to be experienced as pretend. Luhrmann writes:
[believers’] mental images and their sensations – became sharper and
richer and more powerful, they spoke as if their sensory perceptions of the
materially external world became heightened. They imagined God vividly,
and they had rich, deeply emotional, often playful relationships with God.
They felt his love intensely, and they mourned his absence deeply.
(Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 133, emphasis mine)
Mourning the absence of God, whether during short episodes of doubt or
throughout the process of deconversion, is possible due to the development of a
psychologically real relationship with one’s conception of God. This relationship, in
turn, is made possible by humans’ cognitive capacity to attribute mental states in various
ways to many kinds of phenomena and to relate to the agents (in this case, God) that are
posited as explanations of the phenomena in question. Both death and deconversion entail
a reduction in the number of agents that one utilizes to relate to and explain her
environment. In the case of death, a human being has ceased to be an active agent in the
world. Through deconversion, God is no longer experienced as an active agent in the
world.55

55

“Both belief in God and belief in other minds arise from the operations of nonconscious mental tools
generating a nonreflective belief. Other minds and God receive affirmation from a huge number of mental
tools, experiences, and memories” (Barrett, Why Would Anyone 98).
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The inevitable importance of agentive explanations can be seen at many levels of
humans’ attempts to understand the world. As Robert McCauley writes, “Agents’
intentional states and actions are the threads that stitch episodes together both in narrative
lines and in human memory. From those intentional states and actions that our theory of
mind serves up, we weave the patterns in the fabric that constitutes our social and
personal worlds and many peoples’ understandings of their physical surroundings as
well.” (McCauley 185).
The way that humans conceptualize the world, God or no, tends toward agentive
explanations that explicitly invoke or implicitly suggest mental states, preferences, and
desires. These agentive explanations, if believed, can affect humans’ experiences of the
world. Agentive explanations are not only apparent in social circumstances and religious
beliefs, but also in the natural sciences. For example, biologists often discuss natural
selection as if it “wanted” or “preferred” mutations for some purpose, such as the genetic
fitness of the organism (Barrett, Why Would Anyone 113).56 Anthropomorphic
descriptions of realities that do not actually involve agents is almost unavoidable (e.g.,
Heider and Simmel’s explanation of the geometric video.) This reduction in the
affirmation of agentive interpretations is found not only in the natural sciences, however.
It is also found in certain types of theology.

The Dead God of Liberal Theology

While the shift from born-again Christianity to atheism is the focus of this work,
God also may be experienced as ceasing to be an active agent in the world in cases where
56

“Microbiology seems particularly susceptible and the literature is littered with examples of bacteria
having to ‘make a choice to use a particular substrate’ or a ‘decision to make a compound’ and even
‘needing something’” (Davies)
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a believer’s conception of God drastically shifts, but is not wholly lost. This fact can be
seen in less anthropomorphic theologies, including liberal Christian theologies. For
example, versions of Christianity, sometimes referred to as “non-theistic” or “God-asessence” theologies, represent “ever more abstract and depersonalized”
conceptualizations of the representational content of the word “God” (Dennett, Breaking
The Spell 205). These theological positions are doubly relevant to the topic at hand. First,
because many who deconvert from born-again Christianity cite a transitional stage in
which they adhere to a more liberal version of Christian theology (Worth; Vorjack),57 and
second, because liberal theologies often espouse a less person-like God, which relies
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Though it goes without saying, there are exceptions to deconverts experiencing a slow transition out of
Christian theism through liberal theology. Altemeyer and Hunsberger write of their sample of deconverts,
“They had hardly ‘drifted’ into non-belief, but instead had made a ‘break’ so sharp you could almost hear it
snap” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 234).
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less on believers’ theory of mind capacities and more on conceptual debate and
argumentation. More liberal versions of God are usually less anthropomorphic
(McCauley 153), and therefore are too counterintuitive to influence the average believer’s
behavior.
The extremely counterintuitive nature of more sophisticated religious philosophy
or theology is a feature that it shares with science. As Robert McCauley writes:
Carefully crafted theological formations – for example, the classical
Christological doctrine that Jesus is both fully God and fully human
simultaneously… have arisen from processes of argument and debate that
are similar in many respects to those carried out in other scholarly
inquiries, including scientific ones. (McCauley 211-212)
Both detailed systematic theologies and scientific theoretical models are counterintuitive
and mostly the fare of intellectual elites, specialists, or academics.58 Paul Tillich’s idea of
the “ground of Being,” (160) and Episcopal Bishop John Shelby Spong’s idea of God as
“the inescapable depth and center of all that is” (70) do not lend themselves to agentive
explanations and to obvious inferences in the ways that the anthropomorphic God of most
born-again Christianity does. The impersonal nature of these liberal theologies puts them
at a disadvantage when compared to more anthropomorphic, and therefore cognitively
intuitive, conceptions of God.
In fact, some experimental work suggests that when average believers (as opposed
to theological experts) are presented with an ambiguous account of God’s actions, they
rely more on anthropomorphic conceptions of God for their understanding than on
58

In fact, there is evidence to suggest that most religious scientists “tend to view themselves as religiously
liberal” (Ecklund 35).
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conceptions that are overly counterintuitive, even if the latter are doctrinally orthodox.59
This tendency toward “theological incorrectness” (McCauley 219) may explain why
more abstract, less anthropomorphic theologies sometimes serve as a stepping-stone on
the deconverting person’s path to atheism. Science and philosophical theology both
reduce the role of agentive explanations in mental models of the world (McCauley 117).60
However, a reduction of agentive explanations that utilizes familiar religious or
theological terminology (e.g., the term “God,” even if referring to an entirely different
idea) may be less initially threatening to the totality of a deconverting believer’s
worldview.
In cases where a born-again Christian deconvert passes through one or more
stages of liberal or non-anthropomorphic God belief, the death of the deconvert’s gradual
loss of the belief in God may resemble a long battle with disease. God could be said to
gradually lose those qualities that made him who he was. What was once a robust and
active personality progressively gives way to less personal forces or processes.61 The
perception of agency gradually fades from the believer’s mind, replaced by impersonal
physical causation, human agency, and circumstances beyond the control of agents,
human or otherwise. While I have discussed the immediate similarity between death and
deconversion in terms of the perceived reduction of agency, the role of God in most born-
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“Participants may assent to theologically correct claims, they may listen to extensive explications of
those theologically correct formulations, they may even memorize all sorts of propositions about them, but
it does not follow that the mysteries and paradoxes those claims involve are anything that connect with
those participants’ day-to-day thought or reasoning about the matters in question. Religious participants are
prone, in short to theological incorrectness” (McCauley 218-219).
60
“physical scientists often have temperaments that orient them away from the social and toward the
inanimate – their interest and ability in science is then just one expression of this orientation” (Feist 119).
61
This progression away from agentive explanations also has been and is occurring in the natural sciences.
“over the past four centuries modern science has progressively banished reliance on agent causality, first,
from the explanations of physical phenomena and, subsequently, from the explanation of biological
phenomena” (McCauley 117).
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again Christians’ minds makes God’s death more significantly implicative than other
deaths for the deconvert’s view of the world as a whole. This is due to the shift in
teleological or purposive thought necessitated by deconversion.

Chapter VI: Deconstructing Paley’s Watch – The Decline of Purpose
[The world] is magic, true or false… I came to feel as if magic must have a meaning, and
meaning must have someone to mean it. There was something personal in the world,
as in a work of art. – G. K. Chesterton
Hence it is plain [natural objects] achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly.
Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the
archer.
– Thomas Aquinas
God didn't create anything without a purpose,
but roaches come pretty close. – Unknown
For those with regular exposure to religions in the United States, especially bornagain Christianity, the claim that there is a necessary link between a purposeful life and
belief in God is not a novel idea. Pastors often claim that the atheistic life is hopeless or
lacking in meaning and purpose, implying or explicitly stating that humans’ only hope for
a purpose in life is Christian theism and salvation.62 Non-religious sources often make the
assumption that the question of God’s existence and the question of life’s purpose are
conceptually interrelated. This belief, that life’s purpose is related to the issue of theism,
is not an arbitrary feature of Christian doctrinal teachings. It is, rather, a philosophically
62

“The Bible teaches that creation in general and human life in particular were made by God, belong to
God, exist for God, are restless apart from God, and will return to God. If you do not believe in the doctrine
of creation, you likely believe that you came from no one, you are alive on earth for nothing, and that when
you die you will go nowhere…. Indeed, if no savior is coming to rescue me, and there is no better place to
which I can escape at the end of this life, then once the pain of this life gets too much to bear, I should
simply hasten the inevitable. And many do” (Driscoll 104-105, emphasis mine).
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reasonable position to take, regardless of one’s theological beliefs. In other words, the
question of whether God exists has implications for the question of life’s purpose,
whether or not God exists. The reason the two are connected is that the presence of
purpose (or teleology) is necessarily related to the presence of agency.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, “agency” can be understood as
encompassing “people and any other beings we understand as not merely reacting to their
environment but intentionally acting on it” (Barrett, Born Believers 24). I will use
“purpose” and “teleology” interchangeably within this work to refer to the end state or
goal of actions or processes, represented mentally by one or more agent(s) before its
actualization and therefore, brought about intentionally.63 Purpose entails forethought, a
mental representation of a possible future state of the world, or a goal. Purpose is,
therefore, a phenomenon that is logically derivative of the phenomenon of agency. There
is no such thing as an inherent purpose. Meaning must have a mean-er and purpose a
purpose-er.
For this reason, if life as a whole has a purpose, it must come from some agent
who is positioned as such that he/she can intend or foresee the end or goal of life itself.
The theological relevance is obvious. God, a being posited as the creator of life and the
Universe, is in the position to have made life and the Universe for some purpose. God is
in the position to have mentally represented the end or goal of the Universe and life
(including individual lives) before he created them. God is the agent who foresees the
Universe and life, a cosmic agent bestowing purpose on the world.

63

While other definitions of “purpose” or “teleology” that do not rely on psychological or mental
phenomena have been articulated, such definitional nuances, for the most part, are only directly relevant to
specialized areas within philosophy and the natural sciences (Allen).
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The most popular conceptual link between purposive thought and an agentive
God is the claim that the apparent design of living things is evidence for a creator of
those living things, namely God. This is known as the “Teleological Argument” for the
existence of God, or the “Argument from Design” (Craig). While some verses in the
Bible make similar claims about the natural world being evidence of God’s existence or
intention (Today’s New International Version Bible, Romans 19), the eighteenth-century
philosopher and Christian apologist William Paley most famously articulated this line of
reasoning in his work Natural Theology. In what has become one of the most cited
passages by both Christian and atheistic apologists, Paley compares living organisms to
the mechanism of a watch, claiming that both suggest purposive design:
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were
asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for
anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it
perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I
had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the
watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer I
had before given…. There must have existed, at some time, and at some
place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed [the watch] for the
purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its
construction, and designed its use…. Every indication of contrivance,
every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the
works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater
or more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. (Paley)
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“What Are Rocks For?”: A Perfectly Legitimate Question

Human-made tools and artifacts often are created with a purpose in mind (that is,
in the mind of the artificer). The same is not obviously true for natural objects, organisms
or the Universe as a whole. But the attempt to understand organic “design,” inanimate
natural objects and even life itself in terms of teleology may be more than just a byproduct of religious instruction or socialization. Some work in developmental psychology
suggests that humans are cognitively inclined to detect purpose in things that seem, upon
reflection, not to be the outcome of intended purpose or teleology. In other words, we
humans engage in “promiscuous teleology” (Barrett, Born Believers 45). This is
especially true of children. Many experiments in developmental psychology suggest that
children prefer teleological explanations for natural objects and organisms, which adults
would less frequently endorse (Kelemen; Kelemen and DeYanni). As humans develop
into adulthood they begin to restrict teleological explanations in favor of more
straightforwardly causal explanations. However, there is reason to believe that “we do not
simply outgrow the tendency to see purpose in the world but have to learn to tamp it
down through formal education, and even then, it comes sneaking out when we are not
paying careful attention” (55).64 Even scientifically trained adults “possess a bias to favor
purpose-based explanations” (54).65

64

See Kelemen and Rosset.
“prior to a formal scientific education, children promiscuously attribute functions to all kinds of living
and nonliving objects, viewing them as ‘made for something’” (Kelemen, “Why Are Rocks Pointy?” 1448).
65
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Fig. 3. Don Addis Cartoon (Maestro B).

Again, we can see that less social or agentive explanations of phenomena are
more difficult for most humans to acquire, 66 whether in religious discourse (e.g.,
philosophical theology) or the sciences (e.g., evolution by natural selection).67 And
people tend to make sense of the causal processes in the world in social terms, that is, in
terms of agents, who have minds, and act for purposes. This cognitive bias in humans
makes Paley’s argument from design particularly appealing, in that it is very intuitive for
us to think about the natural world in terms of design and purpose.68

Deconversion and the Loss of God’s Purposes
66

Those diagnosed with Autism or Asberger’s syndrome are thought to lack certain social cognitive
tendencies, which makes understanding agentive or social explanations difficult for them. For this reason,
they may have difficulty determining social expectations or conventions and navigating social situations
and may, therefore, be more adept at understanding non-agentive or strictly causal explanations. Robert
McCauley writes, “In sum, a subset of people of normal or above intelligence [those with autistic spectrum
conditions] is simply not built to acquire or mentally maneuver with religion as effortlessly as everyone
else is” (McCauley 262).
67
Some psychological findings suggest that acquiring an understanding of natural selection as a strictly
causal process is difficult and students often misunderstand it, sometimes believing that “individual animals
acted in goal-directed ways to meet their needs and that, through their efforts, their bodies were genetically
transformed to ‘grow’ or produce the functional part” (Kelemen, “Teleological Minds” 4).
68
The social relevance of the debates regarding the teaching of evolution or creationism in public schools
is understandable, given that an explanation of life in terms of mechanical natural processes is extremely
counterintuitive and an explanation in terms of design is much more cognitively comfortable for people.
“At a basic level, positing a designer for the design seems right” (Barrett, Born Believers 55).
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The similarity between the experience of death and that of deconversion with
regard to teleological thinking involves the loss of the perceived agency in one’s social
world. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the agency of God is perceived as going
away through deconversion, just as the agency of another human is perceived as going
away through the event of their death. Through both of these shifts, the agent ceases to be
experienced as an active presence in the experiencer’s environment. As the agent ceases
to be experienced, so do the agent’s purposes. Just as a dead person can no longer engage
in actions for reasons,69 neither can the dead God of the deconverted believer. The shift
from born-again Christian theism to philosophical naturalism de-personalizes the world,
at least to some extent. Natural events, human accidents, and coincidences can no longer
be explained in terms of benevolent purposes, but must be understood by appealing to
forces of cause-and-effect that are under no one’s control. These non-anthropomorphic
causes are, thus, indifferent to questions of human wellbeing or misfortune.
Two differences between the decrease in teleological thinking necessitated by
deconversion and that necessitated by death must be acknowledged. First, deconversion
retroactively undermines teleological explanations, while someone’s death does not. For
example, if one’s parent dies, the parent’s agency (and with it, their purposes) has
vanished from the world. But, that doesn’t entail a reinterpretation of all the events that
the parent was thought to have affected or acted upon during their lifetime. It is only from
their death forward that they are ineligible as an explanation for events, and their
purposes are ineligible as explanations of the reasons for events. However,
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I set aside, here, the issue of belief in the ghosts or spirits of dead individuals. The shift in question is the
shift to philosophical naturalism, which usually discounts all non-material agents.
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reinterpretation of past events and experiences is exactly what is needed in the wake of
deconversion.
Religious experiences in the deconvert’s past must be reframed within her newly
naturalistic worldview. Past experiences or occurrences that were previously attributed to
God must be explained, either in terms that invoke only human agency and purposes or
that do not invoke agency and purpose at all. Similarly, any event in the deconvert’s life
that was thought to have purpose, bestowed by God, is retroactively drained of divine
purpose. At first consideration, it seems that the retroactive nature of deconversion would
threaten the claim that the experience is similar to death. After all, no one has to
reinterpret their entire past because their grandmother dies, but they do if God dies.
The retroactive nature of this reduction in teleological explanations does not
undermine the analogy with death, however. This is because events that were initially
experienced as teleological or purposeful will still be remembered that way. When
recalling an event in which one initially invoked God’s presence or purposes, one will
also remember the initial conceptual interpretation of the event as part of the event and
also the emotions or consequent thoughts that were relevant in light of that interpretation.
For example, in philosopher Wayne Proudfoot’s book Religious Experience, he provides
this example of how our conceptual interpretation of an event serves, in part, to constitute
the event itself:
I may have been frightened by the bear that I saw up ahead on the trail.
My friend points out to me that it is not a bear but a log, and my fear
subsides. What did I really see up ahead? By one interpretation of the
word see, I saw a bear. That is the way I apprehended it, and that
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apprehension accounts for my fear and behavioral response. (Proudfoot
217)
In this hypothetical case, when he remembers what happened, he will remember
being afraid. He will remember seeing the bear. This is true even though he did not
actually come into contact with a bear and even though his current (and revised) best
explanation for what caused the experience involves a log, rather than a bear. The initial
interpretation of an experience serves to determine one’s emotion and “behavioral
response” during the experience (217). These emotions and responses are foundational
components of the experience, regardless of later reinterpretations that may make the
emotions and responses seem irrational or irrelevant in light of new information. So,
when born-again Christians “feel God’s presence… hear God’s voice… [and] their hearts
flood with incandescent joy” (Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 223), the experience will
have involved incandescent joy even if the Christian later deconverts and is forced to
reinterpret the cause of their experience and the appropriateness of their emotional
responses. In other words, just because experiences may have to be reinterpreted in light
of a deconversion, the deconvert will still to some extent remember the experiences as
they were experienced, not only as how they are currently interpreted.
The second difference that must be highlighted is that the scope of the teleological
thinking affected by deconversion is much broader and, in many cases, more foundational
to the person’s view of the world. This is due to the fact that God’s effect on the world,
since God is thought to be the creator of the world, is much larger than the effect of any
individual human being. Deconversion from theism, then, has the potential to affect more
than one’s relationship with God; it can potentially shift one’s evaluation of the world as
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a whole, possibly in a negative direction. This is especially true when interpreting or
reinterpreting tragedy or suffering within a philosophically naturalistic framework. While
understanding fortuitous happenings as the outcome of indifferent causal chains might
pose no emotional difficulty, the same is not necessarily true for the understanding of
tragic events and the fact of suffering in general.

God’s Good Purposes and the Meaning of Tragedy

Clearly, attempts at explaining the purposes of natural objects and living
organisms are not the only way that the concept of God is used to invoke the role of
purpose. Understanding the purpose of tragedy is also an area of human inquiry that lends
itself to explanations in terms of agency, namely God. “When something strikingly
unfortunate happens to us, we and those close to us are prone to ask why” (Barrett, Why
Would Anyone 54). Asking “why?” in the face of tragedy or misfortune is not a difficult
impulse to empathize with, but asking “why” an unfortunate occurrence happened is
ambiguous. On the one hand, an individual might be asking for a causal account of how
the current circumstance came to be (e.g., what factors led to the appearance and growth
of the cancer?) Alternatively, one might be inquiring as to what the purpose of the event
was. For what did this happen? What did the event represent or mean? Often, humans are
inquiring as to the latter, and this form of the question “why?” has teleological thinking
built into it. If an event happened for some purpose, forethought must be involved.
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Someone intended something with this negative event. God, in these cases, is a prime
candidate.
“The ability to see events as symbolically communicating something appears to
be a psychological achievement arising in childhood” (Barrett, Born Believers 52).
Humans’ preference for agentive or socially relevant explanations explains this
tendency.70 Understanding tragedy and misfortune in terms of purpose does not
necessarily discount or replace a causal understanding, but causal explanations usually
have less direct import to the particular social circumstance at hand.
People who [propose teleological explanations] know perfectly well that
disease strikes most people at some point… But general principles are just
that – general… They have nothing to say about particular cases… Hence
the value of supernatural explanations, which are relevant to the
particulars of the situation. (Boyer 197)
Understanding events, especially tragedies and misfortunes, in terms of God’s
intentions and purposes not only provides meaning, and therefore narrative or structural
coherence,71 but God’s intentions are thought to be ultimately benevolent as well. Bornagain Christians, then, invoke (and experience) an anthropomorphic God who bestows
good purposes onto their misfortune and tragedy. When things in life go bad, they do so
in service of the ultimately good purposes of God, even if we humans can’t understand
how this is so. The mega-church pastor and best-selling Christian author Rick Warren
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For a thorough discussion of the role of agentive explanations and social inferences in understanding
misfortune, see Boyer 195-202.
71
“Agents’ intentional states and actions are the threads that stitch episodes together both in narrative lines
and in human memory. From those intentional states and actions that our theory of mind serves up, we
weave the patterns in the fabric that constitutes our social and personal worlds and many peoples’
understandings of their physical surroundings as well” (McCauley 185).
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exemplifies this belief in the ultimate goodness and foreseen purpose of human life and
misfortune in his book The Purpose Driven Life. In the book, Warren invokes the mental
states of God to justify the meaning of human life, writing:
You are not an accident.
Your birth was no mistake or mishap, and your life is no fluke of
nature. Your parents may not have planned you, but God did. He was not
at all surprised by your birth. In fact, he expected it.
Long before you were conceived by your parents, you were
conceived in the mind of God. (Warren, The Purpose Driven Life 22)
The born-again Christian belief that ultimately the events in life happen for good
purposes (i.e., the purposes of God) is not only espoused by best-selling mega-church
pastors, but is also adhered to by Christian laity to soften the blows of the unpredictability
and pain of life. Tanya Luhrmann claims that God belief may be “more about managing
pain than explaining it” (When God Talks Back 295). But, the explanation of pain and
suffering in the born-again Christian context is a necessary factor in how practitioners
manage them. In other words, the belief that “in all things God works for the good of
those who love him” (Romans 8:28) only makes sense if God is actually believed to work
in all things, including seemingly pointless pain and misfortune. “[Born-again Christians]
want a sense of purpose; they want to know that what they do is not meaningless; they
want trust and love and resilience when things go badly” (When God Talks Back 295).
The philosopher Owen Flanagan discusses the desire for transcendent purpose or
meaning in his work The Problem of the Soul. Flanagan nicely articulates the
philosophical naturalist position that neither God nor any other transcendent mean-er
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bestows meaning onto life and the world. He writes, “even though no one knows what
ultimate or transcendent meaning would be if there was such a thing, we like whatever it
is these words and images gesture toward. It seems comforting” (Flanagan, The Problem
of the Soul 12). No doubt part of the reason transcendent purpose and meaning are
comforting is because, especially in light of the belief in a benevolent God, unfortunate
events are thought to happen for ultimately good reasons. Tragedies don’t necessarily
represent a pointless, chaotic and pitiless cosmos, but only painful means to God’s good
ends.
In Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s study of religious converts, one believer
discussed the role his God belief played in how he experienced his father’s death, saying:
It brought a lot of questions to my mind and I think it kind of made me
wobble a bit on where I stand in my faith. It was the hardest time because
questions that I may have asked myself would be like, why would
somebody like my father have to die at a young age? Whereas other
people have fathers who beat them or who beat their wives and they are
still alive. I would ask God these questions, in the end knowing that he has
reasons for everything and that I can’t try and figure him out. (Amazing
Conversions 181)
For this believer as well as many others, the function of God belief is “not about
explaining reality but about transforming it: making it possible to trust that the world is
good, despite ample evidence to the contrary, and to hope, despite loneliness and despair”
(Luhrmann, When God Talks Back 295).
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In today’s cultural discussions regarding religion, proponents of atheism are right
to point out that philosophical naturalism undermines most (if not all) of the conceptual
motivations for religiously-inspired divisiveness, hatred, and violence. However, it often
goes unacknowledged that deconversion from theism also undermines the foundation for
the belief in the inherent goodness of the world. Philosophical naturalism doesn’t replace
a view of the world as inherently positive with a view of the world as inherently negative,
rather it denies inherent value to the world. The Universe is simply indifferent to human
life and purposes. Having completed the argument in favor of the analogy between
deconversion and death, I will conclude with a brief discussion of the broader social
relevance of this work. Where does the analogy I’ve outlined fit within the broader public
discussions between the religious and the non-religious or more specifically, between
Christians and atheists? What impact should understanding the emotional contours of the
deconversion process have on the atheist and humanist movement?
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Chapter VII: Where Do We Go From Here? – Killing God with
Kindness
...militant, uncompromising antitheism inhibits people who do not believe in God from
ever moving beyond articulating how they differ from the religious into the kinds of
efforts that engender community building within and cooperation without.
– Chris Stedman, atheist and interfaith leader
God may be dead, but the urgent issues which impelled us to make him up
still stir and demand resolutions which do not go away when we have been nudged to
perceive some scientific inaccuracies in the tale of the seven loaves and fishes.
– Alain de Botton, philosophical essayist
Higher questions of meaning and purpose are not important.
Human life is no more noble than that of a cockroach.
– Scientist quoted in Science vs. Religion, Ecklund
In an op-ed piece for the Catholic Herald online entitled “The Tragedy at the
Heart of New Atheism,” Friar Alexander Lucie-Smith offers a critique of the New
Atheism movement that is not based primarily on the claim that his Christian theism is
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factually true.72 Instead, Lucie-Smith claims that the New Atheism views the world as
ultimately tragic rather than comedic and that this is a problem. He provides a quote by
Richard Dawkins that enunciates this view: “The universe we observe has precisely the
properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no
good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference” (qtd. in Lucie-Smith).
Lucie-Smith then goes on to claim that this statement is less a statement of
science and more “an existential statement of belief about the nature of the universe”
(Lucie-Smith). The Friar’s problem with atheism, in this case, is what he thinks are its
evaluative consequences. He believes atheism necessitates a negative evaluation of the
world in general and he sees this as tragic. Lucie-Smith is not articulating a concern about
the fact that Dawkins conceptually believes the world is without inherent purpose, but
that atheists “feel that life teaches them that there is no purpose to anything, only blind,
pitiless indifference” (Lucie-Smith, emphasis mine).
This critique of atheistic thought, then, is based on atheism’s potential to engender
certain emotional outcomes or dispositions, rather than its truth-value. Critiques such as
this one cannot be met with only appeals to scientific findings and the exposure of
inconsistencies in popular theological formations. Those in the atheist movement in the
U.S. (the loudest voices at least) have not adequately addressed or sensitively handled the
legitimate concerns regarding the potentially negative emotional consequences of
adjusting to a purposeless and “pitiless” universe.73
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Lucie-Smith, however, is a Catholic theist and his theistic beliefs can be seen in how he delivers his
critique.
73
It should be noted, in the name of fairness, that the critiques of the emotional effects of atheism are often
hopelessly tangled up with non-scientific speculation and doctrinal religious claims about the inadequacy of
a naturalistic worldview. For example, Lucie-Smith writes, “[Dawkins] is clearly in the camp of an earlier
professor, Friedrich Nietzsche. This is a serious matter, because the Nietzschean vision is one that not
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In light of the understanding that the experience of deconversion is analogous to
the experience of the death of another person in the specific ways I’ve discussed, the
approach taken by those espousing an atheistic worldview deserves attention.
Specifically, those endorsing and promoting the atheist/humanist/rationalist movement(s)
should be compassionate rather than rhetorically antagonistic toward the religious.74
Atheists and humanists should take seriously the potential difficulty of experiencing the
loss of a psychologically real God-relationship, as well as the loss of transcendent
meaning and purpose necessitated by that experience.
Some religiously inclined thinkers claim that (questions of truth-value aside) the
loss of theistic types of religiosity necessarily will cause more harm than good in
emotional, psychological and social terms (D’Souza; Driscoll 101-102). I would not go
so far. Rather, I claim that the implications of deconversion for one’s view of the world
are a complex and important issue that can’t be easily categorized in terms as simple as
“harmful” or “helpful.” The analogy with death highlights this complexity in that
deconverting individuals may experience either grief or liberation, depending on their
previously held conception of God.75

only contradicts the idea of Divine Providence, but it also makes science of any sort nonsensical, in that it
seems to deny intrinsic meaning to physical phenomena, attributing meaning only to human will” (LucieSmith).
74
This suggestion is meant to reference religious moderates (i.e., most religious people). Fierce and
uncompromising denouncements of religious extremists who employ violence, threats of violence, or
intolerance are almost always appropriate.
75
For an in-depth discussion of the question of the harm that irreligion could cause, see Dennett, Breaking
The Spell 203.
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Fig. 4. Calvin and Hobbes Cartoon (Watterson 30).

Although not inspired specifically by the analogy between deconversion and
death, some atheistic commentators have begun to realize that the denouncement of
theism should be thought of as the beginning of articulating an atheistic worldview, rather
than the end. Philosophical essayist Alain de Botton, in his divisive book Religion For
Atheists: A Non-believer’s Guide to the Uses of Religion, writes, “the real issue is not
whether God exists or not, but where to take the argument once one decides that he
evidently doesn’t” (11). De Botton goes on to articulate his own reimagining of the place
of ritual, aesthetics, moral teamwork, community building, and engagement with the
awe-inspiring aspects of life in a society that has rejected the supernatural tenets of
religion, such as theism.
While de Botton does not address the deconversion process directly, he
recognizes that a rejection of theism is a complex matter and not without its own
challenges. For example, he writes, “The signal danger of life in a godless society is that
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it lacks the reminders of the transcendent and therefore leaves us unprepared for
disappointment and eventual annihilation. When God is dead, human beings – much to
their detriment – are at risk of taking psychological center stage” (de Botton 200). De
Botton’s recognition that religion and transcendence can and should have a place in a
post-theistic world has drawn critics from both atheistic and religious circles. He writes
that, through his work, he seeks to “burn off religions’ more dogmatic aspects in order to
distil a few aspects of them that would prove timely and consoling to skeptical
contemporary minds facing the crises and griefs of finite existence on a troubled planet”
(19).
Chris Stedman is another example of an atheist thinker who conveys a less
abrasive and more humanistic philosophical naturalism. “His atheism doesn’t hate God; it
loves people” (Patel, xii). Stedman, in his book Faithiest: How an Atheist Found
Common Ground with the Religious, writes about the distinctive role that atheists can
play in conducting interreligious dialogue and encouraging productive social action.
Stedman himself experienced the deconversion process, from evangelical Christian to
non-religious atheist.76 His experience mirrors many of the aspects of deconversion that I
have discussed in this work, and his description of the experience bears quoting at length:
I wanted to believe in God. I wanted to love Jesus and participate in his
fellowship of believers. I looked to many Christians as pillars of goodness,
and I wanted to emulate their compassion and social justice ethic… I
earnestly believed that, to be like them, I needed to believe in their God. It
seemed to be a package deal, but I was much more invested in the
76

Stedman distinguishes between “religious nontheists or non-religious nontheists..” Examples could be
SBNR (spiritual but not religious) individuals or more traditionally religious individuals, such as Buddhists,
who don’t hold theistic beliefs. See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ktphhmd1eQI
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positive, human-affirming ethics and the community aspect of it than I
was in the theism…. It was kind of heartbreaking, then, when I realized
that I no longer believed in God... It was as if I had come home from an
especially long week at work to find out that God had packed up His
things and moved out days before without leaving a forwarding address,
and I’d just been too busy to notice His absence…. Letting go of God was
difficult. Even as I began to step up my antireligious rhetoric in college, I
privately mourned God. I wanted to believe and was disappointed in my
inability to do so. I missed Him – and the community and ethical
commitments that came along with Him. (Stedman 83, 85)
Stedman’s description of his deconversion highlights many of the emotional shifts that
can make the deconversion experience difficult.
As I have discussed, deconversion from theism is in many ways potentially
similar to the experience of the death of another human being. Given that this is the case,
and given the potential personal, social, and political impact that such a shift can have,
there is a need for sensitivity, understanding, and respect between religious and nonreligious individuals and groups. The atheistic thinkers that I have explored above
exemplify an approach to the topic of religion (and theism, more specifically) that seeks
constructive rhetoric and action. Rather than simply articulating the difference in
metaphysical beliefs between Christians and atheists in the name of increasing adherents,
this approach attempts to create understanding and affirmation even in the presence of
disagreement.
Socially divisive or scientifically untenable religious rhetoric need not go
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uncontested by the atheist and secularist communities. But the one-sided representation
of deconversion from theism as always wholly liberating or positive, ignores certain
emotionally difficult aspects of the deconversion process. The non-religious should
recognize and acknowledge the potential experience of loss (of orienting and hopeful
beliefs) that is the deconversion process and tailor their polemics and “evangelism”
tactics accordingly. The atheist movement should, therefore, highlight the adoption of a
compassionate and humanistic worldview, rather than simply articulating their distaste
for religion or theism. It is my hope that the analogy of deconversion as similar to death
can aid in the process of humanizing religious individuals and their theological
commitments for those who adhere to a philosophically naturalistic worldview.
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